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I. INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN DIVORCE AT THE EDGE OF FAULT

A

T mid-point in the twentieth century, the American divorce system was
umversally acknowledged a failure. The conception that divorce was a
process through which "innocent" spouses proved marital "fault" in an adversary
proceeding against their emng partners, whereupon the state "punished" the
"guilty" spouses by issuing a divorce decree, existed only in the insular mind of
appellate opinions.
Prior to the California divorce revolution of 1969,2 many American
jurisdictions had passed incompatibility statutes3 and living apart laws4 in an
effort to slow the mounting divorce rate by substituting neutral factors for the
traditional requirement of proving fault. Incompatibility statutes were designed
to afford a couple relief from continued wedlock in the face of serious and
unrelenting disharmony ' Living apart laws provided theoretical recognition that
dead mamages deserved a formal burial. According to this latter rationale, after
separation periods of five, seven or as long as ten years, mamages were presumed
in many states to have expired by the passage of time and the obstinacy of the
couple.
But both the incompatibility devices and the living apart provisions failed to
attract many divorce customers, Americans largely ignored these early no-fault
experiments, preferring to continue divorcing under the familiar-and quite
corrupted-fault system.7 Unhappy wives and husbands found the lengthy
separation periods required under the living apart statutes much too inconvenient
compared to the rapidity of the traditional fault divorce.8 On their face, the
incompatibility laws appeared to satisfy the popular call for an amicable end to
2. 1969 California Laws ch. 1608.
3. 1935 Alaska Laws ch. 54; Del. Laws ch. 296 (1968); 1969 Kansas Laws ch. 286; 1967
Nev. Laws ch. 278; 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 54; 1953 Old. Laws ch. 22; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. Il, ch.
44 § 7 (1921).
4. 1915 Ala. Acts at 370; 1931 Arizona Laws ch. 12; 1937 Ark. Acts no. 167; 1957 Del.
Laws ch. 27" 49 Stat. 539 (D.C. 1935); 1967 Haw. Laws ch. 76; 1945 Idaho Laws ch. 125; 1850
Ky. Acts ch. 498; 1916 La. Acts no. 269; 1937 Md. Laws ch. 396; 1931 Nev. Laws ch. 111; 1966
N.Y. Laws ch. 254; 1907 N.C. Laws ch. 89; 1933 P.R. Laws no. 46; 1893 R.I. Public Laws ch.
1187; 1969 S.C. Acts no. 170; TEx. R. Civ (1925) art. 4629; 1941 Vt. Laws no. 43; 1960 Va. Acts
ch. 108; 1917 Wash. Laws ch. 106; 1969 W Va. Acts ch. 49; 1866 Wis. Laws ch. 37" 1939 Wyo.
Laws ch. 106.
5. See Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 807 (3rd Cir. 1952).
6. In 1929, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island articulated the rationale for living apart
statutes: "Any injury to the state from the dissolution of the family cannot now be cured by

insisting on the continuance of a semblance of marnage when the substance has long since
disappeared."

Dever v. Dever, 146 A. 478, 479 (R.L 1929).

7. In 1948, only three percent of all American divorces were obtained under the living apart
statutes, although such laws were in effect in 14 states and the District of Columbia. PAUL H.
JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DivORCE 123 thl. 59, 125-26 (1959).

8. Referring to Washington's statute requiring an eight-year separation, one author exclaimed
"eight years is a long time in a world where life is short." William Seagle, The Right to
Consolation, 2 AM. MERCURY 39, 41 (1924).
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deeply dissatisfying marriages. But many appellate courts had difficulty
disentangling incompatibility from the web of fault jurisprudence.9 This
reluctance to affirm the plain meaning of the statutory language confirmed
Professor Walter Wadlington's observation that, in most jurisdictions, "the
ingrained concept of fault [was] difficult for the judiciary to overcome."'
The fault system constituted a sieve for the rising divorce flow Neither living
apart statutes nor incompatibility laws had succeeded in slowing the divorce rate.
The regime of fault had not only failed to preserve the nuclear family, it had
become the engine of transformation into the post-World War II age of divorce.
Once conservative reformers identified fault itself as the rate-determining step for
the rise in divorce, they proposed radical surgery in an effort to reverse what they
perceived as an ominous decline in the stability of the American family In
looking for a new way to disassemble the fault system in order to render divorces
much more difficult to obtain, they found a useful-if surprising- model at
hand: the juvenile court.
A product of the Progressive drive to merge governmental activism with
therapeutic ends, the juvenile court occupied what Andrew J. Polsky has described
as the "shadowy ground between legal tribunal and social agency."" As the
immediate but much more potent successor to the House of Refuge and
Reformatory movements, the juvenile court transformed legal institutions to
further its goal of adjusting the personalities and behaviors of the predominantly
lower-class children who swamped its caseloads. The ultimate goal of the new
court and its vigorous social service adjunct, the juvenile probation department,
was to produce a quiescent and obedient hybrid child with lower-class skills but
middle-class values. 2
Child reformation, as so defined, was rarely achieved. But the juvenile court
survived-and continues to persist-as a paradigm of professional crossfertilization. Paul W Alexander, the prime advocate of administering therapeutic
divorce through family courts, spent many years as a juvenile court judge in Oluo.
He aimed to expand the power of this coercive social experiment to families
whom he and his fellow reformers viewed as socially irresponsible. Alexander
worded the issue so as to make the connection clear: "Since the problems in a

9.

See, e.g., Chappell v. Chappell, 298 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1956); Clark v. Clark, 225 P.2d 147

(N.M. 1950).
10. Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury,52 VA. L. REV 32, 52 (1966).
11. ANDREW J. POLSKY, THE RISE OF THE THERAPErlIc STATE 66 (1991).
12. For literature on the origins of the juvenile court, see generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); Polsky, supra note 1I; DAVID
J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGREsSIVE AMERICA (1980); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAim PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE
COURT EXPERIMENT (1978); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920 (1977); Sanford J.
Fox, JuvenileJusticeReform: An HistoricalPerspective,22 STAN. L. REV 1187 (1970); Alexander

W Pisciotta, Treatment on Trial: The Rhetoric and Reality of the New York House of Refuge,
1857-1935, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 151 (1985); J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Vicious Reform: Juvenile
Incarceration in America, 1825-1925 (1977) (unpublished M. Arts thesis, University of Virginia).
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divorce case are so much more social than legal, why isn't it logical to take the
embattled spouses out of the antiquated old divorce mill with its creaking
legalistic machinery and put them into a socialized court, as we have done with
the juveniles?"' 3
America after World War II was the land of the experts, and "socialized" courts
for marital woes fit hand-m-glove with the powerful emphasis on scientific
guidance of everyday problems.14 Legal and social science experts viewed most
divorce-seekers as "sick" couples whose freedoms should be curtailed because of
the adverse social consequences of their contemplated action. They believed in
a strong link between divorce and future juvenile delinquency for the children of
the severed union, who almost by defimtion were doomed to be neglected as a
result of their parents' breach of the familial bond. As Lynne Carol Halem has
noted, this "etiological relationship between divorce and childhood crime
provided a rationale for modeling the family tribunal after the juvenile courts."' 5
Postwar America witnessed the acceleration of the transition of the family
from the "institutional" to the "companionship" form. While the quest for family
togetherness embodied the ideal of happiness, the individualistic demands of a
romance culture often undermined family unity. The particular tensions on
women as wives and mothers became lightning rods for significant cultural
dissatisfactions, as exemplified by the vituperative attacks on men's alimony
obligations.
Issues of crime, social deviance and divorce thus merged in front of the
backdrop of the uneven diffusion of social science concepts into the legal
profession. Seen through a haze of often-unacknowledged class bias, a single
solution emerged: Paul Alexander's therapeutic divorce, admimstered by family
courts composed of equal parts sheriff and social worker, counselor and judge.
11. THE CASE OF THE ALL-TOO-CONSENTING ADULTS
The fault system may have been discredited, but no lobby for discontented
spouses arose-nor could one have been easily imagmed-to campaign for more
realistic divorce. Such a campaign would, in any event, have been superfluous.
As two generations of readily-divorced Americans had shown, legal absolution
for a broken marriage could easily be purchased with a modest amount of pious
perjury When the required penance of social ostracism disappeared between the
two World Wars, the divorce court lost its menacing aspect and took on the bland
coloration of a registry
Divorce changed as mamage changed. As Sociologist Paul H. Landis
reminded readers of The Forum magazine shortly after the end of World War lI,
13. Paul W Alexander, Is There a Divorce Evil? OHIO MAO., Apr. 1945, reprintedin XCI
CONG. RECORD, A 1222.
14. See ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR
ERA 26-27 (1988); JOSEPH VEROFF ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH IN AMERICA: PATTERNS OF HELP-

SEEKING FROM 1957 To 1976, at 7-8, 10 (1981).
15.

LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES

221 (1980).
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the "companionship family," which "prizes romance and its ethereal happiness,"
was replacing the "institutional family rooted in the traditions of child-bearing,
joint economic activity and filial duty." 6 The definition of the ideal family
limned by sociologists conveyed this change crisply, simply by omitting any
reference to social responsibility A successful family was one in which "husband
and wife
7 utilize[d] their resources to work out a satisfactory mutual relationship."'
So pervasive was this new understanding of mamage that when a Catholic
prolocutor opined that marriage should not be "primarily concerned with the
happiness of the parties," he admitted that the notion of hell-or-high-water
marriage would be seen as "ridiculous" by some.'
No overriding
commumtanan "purpose" distracted couples from the focus on satisfaction. Even
the emphasis on couples was, however, somewhat over-mclusive: once happiness
usurped duty as the mainstay of marriage, the guideposts for satisfaction became
increasingly self-centered.
With Amencans viewing delight in marriage as the end, rather than the means,
many thousands of spouses eschewed the work of relationship for the pursuit of
what Philip Wylie termed the "'one and only' myth.'" 9 Movies, pulp
magazines, television soap operas, advertisements and virtually the entire
repertoire of popular music projected a "romantic complex creat[ing] expectations
of a standard of psychic living which cannot be realized in most mamages." 20
Writer John McPartland found post-World War II Americans simultaneously
raunchy and prudish, "the most sensual and profligate of peoples, worshippers of
breast and thigh," while at the same time "a monogamous and chaste people to
whom virginity is so sacred that it cannot be mentioned on our radios."2'
McPartland concluded that "we raise our young in this never-never land where
sex is bright and gay but doesn't exist."

16. Paul H. Landis, Divorce in Our Time, 105 FORUM 865 (1946).
MABEL A. ELLIOTT & FRANCIS E. MERRILL, SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 597-98 (rev. ed.
1941). See STEVEN MiNuZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 107 (1988); W.F OGBURN & M.F NMKOFF, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
CHANGING FAMILY 32-57, 123-43 (1955); Robert S. Redmount, An Analysis of Marmage Trends
and Divorce Policies, 10 VAND. L. REV.516 (1957). See also Warren P Hill, Some Aspects of
Family Law, 13 OIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1952) (concluding that "with the family thus stripped of all
social utility beyond the mere material provision for offspring, it is small wonder that when love
is dead the union tends to fly apart").
18. James P Kelly, History and Principles of Catholic Family Law, in VIRGINIA LAW
17

WEEKLY, DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS: A COMPILATION OF THE ORIGINAL DICTA PUBLISHED

BY THE VIRGINIA LAW WEEKLY, 1949-1950, at 14-20 (Stanley C. Moms, Jr. ed., 1950) [hereinafter
DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS].

19. Philip Wylie, What's Wrong with American Marriages,49 READER'S DIo. 37, 39 (1946).
See Ernest W Burgess, The End of Romantic Marriage, 121 COLLIER'S 12 (1948).
20. ROBERT F WINCH,THE MODERN FAMILY 389 (1952).
21. John McPartland, Footnote on Sex, 192 HARPER'S 212-13 (Mar. 1946).
22. Id.
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The state of marrage itself, oddly enough, was roundly ignored by most media,
which concentrated on the passion and pathos of romance and courtship. Once
Cinderella married the Prince, neither was heard from again. Romantic comedies
on the screen ended with "a kiss, blackout, marriage."" In the popular culture,
the wedded state lay in the merry miasma beyond the altar, an aesthetic limbo as
much terra incognita as Hamlet's "undiscover'd country from whose bourn / No
traveler returns."24 David L. Cohn suggested to the Atlantic's readers that marnage was "presented to the young by their elders, the movies, and slick magazine
fiction, as a perpetual Christmas Eve with Tiny Tim passing double Martins and
saying 'God bless you, every one! '2
In the pointed words of two
contemporary sociologists, "the quiet pleasures of conjugal happiness" constituted
a "denial of the romantic faith, which tells us that we should continue to bum
'
with the same pure, gemlike flame for the rest of our lives."26
The burgeoning divorce rate in the 1940s indicated, however, not a disparagement of marriage, but its opposite: "modern couples demand more from marriage
than their ancestors did. 2 ' After the Depression, Americans hankered after the
marred state in record numbers. During the decade, the divorced percentage of
the population grew from two to three percent. But the mamed cohort shot up
from sixty to sixty-six percent of the population.28
World War II magnified the popularity of the marital state even before
hostilities began. Samuel Tenenbaum noted the large increase in marriages during
the summer and fall of 1940, as the Selective Service Act was debated and
passed. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor "set off a frenzied rush to the altar,"
while the tense psychology of wartime created a "pathological interest in sex" as
part of its heightened emphasis on adventure."
War conditions took their toll on marriages, replicating in a far broader
dimension the American social experience of World War I. Tenenbaum, a New
York City reporter-tumned-psychologist, observed that war made husbands cynical
and wives independent. ° The long separations made necessary by the conflict

23.

MOLLY HASKELL, FROM REVERENCE

To

RAPE: THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN THE

MoviEs 22 (2d ed. 1987).
24. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act Ill, sc. i.
25. David L. Cohn, Are Americans Polygamous? 180 ATLANTIC 30, 32 (Aug. 1947).
26. ANDREw G. TRuxAL & FRANCIs E. MERRILL, THE FAMILY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 12130 (1947).
27. Paul H. Landis, MarriageHas Improved, 62 READER'S DIG. 13, 13 (June 1953). As W
Somerset Maugham quipped, Amiencan women expected of their husbands "a perfection English
women only hope to find in their butlers." Id. at 14.
28. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNiTED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES To 1970: PART I, at 9, 54-55, 64 (1975) (reporting that the
percentage of unmarned Amencans shrunk during the 1940s from 31% to 23%).
29. Samuel Tenenbaum, The Fate of Wartime Marrages, 61 AM. MERCURY 530, 531 (Nov.
1945). See WILLARD WALLER, WAR AND THE FAMILY (1940); Harold M. Wayne, G.. Divorce

Dangers, 114 COLLIER'S 13 (Oct. 21, 1944).
30.

Tenenbaum, supra note 29, at 534.
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raised sexual temptation beyond the levels of many to resist.3' War time was
rushed time. As America raced through military preparation, a similar telescoping
occurred within courtship rituals. Consequently, as historian D'Ann Campbell has
observed, World War II divorces "typically involved young couples who had not
been acquainted very long and who had only a poor opportunity to know each
other before the husband was shipped out. Immaturity was a basic factor, often
leading to infidelity.""
Marital infidelity occurred on both the home front and the front lines, of
course, but the feared promiscuity of the war years was that of the stateside
woman, not of her soldier husband. This skewed perspective was compatible with
contemporary sociology, which equated women's drive for equality with moral
degeneration. As a 1940 text put it: "The greater social freedom of women has
more or less inevitably led to a greater degree of sexual laxity, a freedom which
strikes at the heart of family stability ""
In the aftermath of war, one Newark, New Jersey judge heard twenty divorce
cases in six weeks involving adultery alleged against soldiers' wives. Crowded
dockets transformed divorce courts into express lanes. A Chattanooga, Tennessee
Bar Association report described a 1945 court session in which twelve divorces
were granted in seventeen minutes. 4 A Newsweek report on "Divorce: The
Postwar Wave" highlighted Chicago jurist Edwin A. Robson's record-breaking
stretch heanng 2000 divorce cases in the last four months of 1945.
Robson
responded to the divorce craze by installing a nursery adjacent to his courtroom
to mind the children of these exploding wartime unions.
These dramatic changes served notice that a culture of divorce abounded in
post-war America.
Charlton Ogburn, vice-chair and counsel for the
Interprofessional Commission of Mamage and Divorce Laws, expressed his
dismay that the American public "has remained rather apathetic in the face of the
disturbing character of the divorce evil: the increasing number of divorces and
the laxity of the courts in hearing and granting divorces, especially in undefended
cases often based on fraud and collusion in violation of the statutes. 3s7 But
Ogbum was mistaken. The public was not "rather apathetic;" it supported the
right to divorce even if it was not in actual hot pursuit. Maxine B. Virtue's
observation that the "present cultural mores generally disapprove of the spouse

31. Id.
32.

D'ANN CAMPBELL, WOMEN AT WAR WITH AMERICA. PRIVATE LIVES IN A PATRIOTIC

ERA 89 (1984).
33. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 587-88

marital
34.
35.
36.

(Reuben Hill & Howard Baker eds., 1940). On
relations dunng the war years, see MAY, supra note 14, at 65-75.
See Reginald Heber Smith, Dishonest Divorce, 180 ATLANTIC 42 (Dec. 1947).
Divorce: The Postwar Wave, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 7, 1946, at 33-34.
Id. See Irene Stokes Culman, You Married Him-Now Stick with Him, 120 GOOD

HOUSEKEEPING 17 (May 1945); Divorce: National Scandal, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1947, at 27;
Liquor and Lipstick TIME, Oct. 15, 1945, at 14.

37.

Charlton Ogburn, The Role ofLegal Services in Family Stability, 272 ANNALS 127 (1950).
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who does not co-operate when asked for a divorce"38 more accurately suggested
the flavor of the post-war divorce culture.
Despite the routine of divorces, the fault system for adjudicating them
continued to provide an endless subject for exposes which were not so much
damning as they were mere gawking at the human zoo. A 1945 Life magazine
picture spread on divorce m Los Angeles remarked that mental cruelty "includes
anything from a husband's reading too much to his disliking the way his wife
cooks steak."3 9 Some cases resembled that of Rowena Laird, who claimed her
husband was rude to her friends and received a sympathetic murmur from the
bench: "Better luck next time."" Similarly, Anna MacGillevery's complaint
stemmed from her husband's insistence that she wear lipstick.41 Her plea for
autonomy was rewarded with a divorce.4 2 But not all the divorce stones substituted conjugal ennui for the statutory ground. Neva Krebs testified that her
spouse stayed out at night, beat her up and once tried to choke her."3
One tale bore the marks of its Hollywood origin. The caption for two glossy
pictures of recent divorcee Corinne Sylvia posing for Los Angeles newspaper
photographers noted that she obtained her divorce by showing that after her
husband persuaded her to vacation in Texas, he failed to send her the money to
return to southern California. As Groucho Marx quipped, "Hollywood brides
keep the bouquets and throw away the grooms."" In Michigan, readers of the
Saturday Evening Post learned, the cruelty standard specified "extreme and
repeated cruelty " 45 But this enhanced requirement could be met, during the
average six-minute divorce hearing, by proof that the husband criticized his wife's
clothing or refused to speak to her mother.'$
In Illinois, which also required a showing of "extreme and repeated cruelty,"
divorce court protocol demanded that the wife testify that her husband had
slapped her precisely twice. The Saturday Evening Post sent John Bartlow
Martin to observe Chicago divorce trials. Martin reported that the key questions
and answers were always scripted, as follows:
Q. During the time of your mamage, how did you treat your husband?
A. Good.

38.

MAXINE B. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT 229-30 (1956).

Divorce Mill: Los Angeles Frees Many More Mismated Couples Than Reno, LIFE, July
23, 1945, at 55 (hereinafter Divorce Milli. On California's expansive reading of mental cruelty,
39.

see Max Rhemstem, Our Dual Law of Divorce: The Law in Action Versus the Law of the Books,
m THE LAW SCHOOL, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE 39 (1952)
[hereinafter CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE].
40. Divorce Mill, supra note 39, at 55.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. JILL BAUER, FROM "I Do" TO "I'LL SUE:" AN IRREVERENT COMPENDIUM FOR SURVIVORS
OF DIVORCE 208 (1993).
45. David G. Wittels, Perjury Unlimited, 222 SAT. EVE. POST 28, 133 (Feb. 18, 1950).
46. Divorce Mill, supra note 39, at 55.
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Q.
A.

How did he treat you?
Bad.
Q. Calling your attention to [specified date], what, if anything, occurred?
A. He struck me.
Q. Calling your attention to [second date), what, if anything, occurred?
A. [Same response.]
Q. Did you give him any provocation or reason for striking you?
A. No.
Q. Did this leave any marks or bruises?
A. Yes.
Q. Cause you pam and suffering?
A. Yes. 7

This scenario was typically followed by a stipulation regarding the property
settlement, the wife's waiver of alimony, and a request that the husband pay the
wife s counsel fees. The wife's testimony was then rapidly corroborated by two
family members or friends. The entire hearing took eight minutes. Uncontested
divorce litigation thoroughly deserved Paul Alexander's scorn as "a sham battle
against the little man who isn't there."
H. "WiTHouT GuILT OR SIN"
Although family courts had been proposed pnor to World War II,
very few had
been established. Maverick judge and social radical Ben Lindsey did Is share
m widely disparate venues. After the Ku Klux Klan drove hin from the domestic
relations bench in Colorado, Lindsey re-emerged in California, where he won
election to a judgeship in 1934 and provided the leadership which resulted in the
establishment of the Children's Conciliation Court of Los Angeles m 1939 49
In Milwaukee, a "pre-divorce" court with a "Department of Conciliation" had
opened its doors in 1935.50

47. John Bartlow Martin, Divorce: A Day in Court, 231 SAT. EVE. POST 19 (Nov. i, 1958).
48. Paul W Alexander, The FolliesofDivorce: A TherapeuticApproach to the Problem, 1949
U. ILL. L.F 695 (1949), reprinted in 36 A.B.A. J. 105 (1950) [hereinafter Alexander, The Follies
of Divorce]. See VIRTUE, supra note 38, at 52 (confirming more extensively the mechanistic
routine of Chicago divorce heanngs in the 1950s).
49. JOSEPH KIRK FOLSOM, THE FAMILY: ITS SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 365
(1934). On the history of the intrepid Judge Lindsey, see CHARLES E. LARSEN, THE GOOD FIGHT:

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BEN B. LINDSEY (1972). See also Charles E. Larsen, Ben Lindsey:
Symbol of Radicalism in the 1920's, in FREEDOM AND REFORM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER 255 (Harold M. Hyman & Leonard W Levy eds., 1967); John Bartlow Martin,
Divorce: Effort to Save a Troubled Marage, 231 SAT. EE. POST 36 (Nov. 8, 1958); Frank J.
Taylor, A Court To Prevent Divorce, 103 NEW REPUBLIC 239 (Aug. 19, 1940).
The statute creating the conciliation court declared its intention "to provide means for the
reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family controversies." 1939
Cal. Stat. ch. 737 § 1730.
50. EWING COCKRELL, SUCCESSFUL JUSTICE 715 (1939); Milwaukee: MarriagesPatchedUp,
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Surprisingly, however, the most well-known family court, due entirely to the
boundless energy and public charisma of its founding judge, was located in the
minuscule metropolis of Toledo, Ohio. Judge Paul W Alexander fired the
movement for family courts from the 1940s to the 1960s. Hailed as the "father
of family law,"'" he most lucidly-and persistently-articulated the philosophy
of therapeutic divorce, and his life work greatly influenced the evolving
understanding of marriage and the law for the remainder of the twentieth century
Paul Alexander was a rebel in a robe. He believed in the rehabilitative power
of the judicial system, and he bitterly criticized the divorce process because it
rewarded perjury and punished forgiveness, thus reversing common sense. Unlike
radicals who desired that the law reflect unalloyed individualism and free choice
in marital partners, however, Alexander held that a judge's main role was to reintroduce warring couples to each other under a flag of truce. Each divorce
petition represented an opportunity for the state to reunite the parties. During the
parley, social science experts-the rehabilitation professionals, as Alexander
viewed them-would coax the couple into a reconciliation.
After practicing law for nearly a quarter-century in his home town of Toledo,
Ohio, Alexander was in 1937 elevated to the domestic relations and juvenile
bench, on which he served for three decades. He converted the Toledo court into
a national showplace for the implementation of his family court ideas. Despite
never achieving his complete reform program, Alexander was widely recognized
as the pioneer of and godfather to the therapeutic divorce movement.52
Alexander kept a carved ship's model on the wall behind his desk. Over it
appeared the legend: "Who doth not answer to the rudder shall answer to the
rock." 53 Alexander's life-long ambition was to steer. His professional attainments were many, at various times he headed the National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges, the National Conference of Juvenile Agencies and the Legal Section
of the National Conference on Family Life. He also served as trustee of the
National Probation and Parole Association, and he chaired the American Bar
Association's Interprofessional Commission on Marriage and Divorce Laws.
Alexander realized that couples engaged in an uncivil war would not willingly
participate in a process aimed at frustrating their goal of secession. Quite aware
that the fault regime offered no check on the divorce rate, he proposed a
conservative revolution in liberal clothes: the elimination of all divorce grounds
'4
and their replacement with a therapeutic process, divorce "without guilt or sin."
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1948, at 27 See VIRTUE, supra note 38, at 174-214 (describing the operation
of the Milwaukee family court).
51. Sol Morton Isaac, Family Law and the Lawyer, 2 J. FAM. L. 43, 47 (1962).
52.

See, e.g., PAUL H. LANDIS, MAKING THE MOST OF MARRIAGE 504-05 (1955); Qumtin

Johnstone, Divorce: The Place of the Legal System in Dealingwith Marital-DiscordCases, 31 OR.
L. REv 317 (1952); Ogburn, supra note 37, at 127-33. See also VIRTUE, supra note 38, at 174-214
(descriptions of the operation of the Toledo court); Gertrude Samuels, Courtsfor the Family Go on
Trial, NY. TIMES MAO., Dec. 20, 1953, at 16 (same).
53. VIRTUE, supra note 38, at dedication page.
54. Paul W Alexander, Divorce Without "Guilt" Or "Sin, " N.Y TIMES MAG., July 1, 1951,
at 14 [hereinafter Alexander, Divorce Without].
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Divorces were to be granted upon the breakdown of the marriage. But who
determined whether a marriage was sunk or shipshape? Not the parties, whose
impulsiveness rendered them incapable of understanding their true condition.
Alexander believed that troubled wives and husbands manifested their confusion
and helplessness by the act of filing a divorce petition, which he deemed "an
application
for the remedial services of the state."" In Alexander's view,
the central paradigm of the old divorce court had been misconceived. The fault
system's call for an 'innocent' complainant and a 'guilty' defendant did not
accurately reflect the complex psychological makeup of conjugal relationships.
In family life, the question of guilt, borrowed fiom criminal law, was a clumsy
barometer of the state of the marriage.
Although he womed about the quotidian fraud perpetrated upon the judicial
system, Alexander's main concern lay with the immoral consequences of a system
of divorce grounds. When traditional adversary procedures are "employed to
resolve intrafamilial conflicts," he observed, they "tend to fan the flames."' He
would replace courtroom dogfights with a "non-adversary or conference type of
procedure in determining issues and prescribing remedies. 57 Marital warfare
would end in a therapeutic armistice: as the oft-quoted title of one of
Alexander's articles phrased it, "Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the
Trenches."58
While most critics viewed the system of divorce grounds as too conservative,
Alexander perceived it as too liberal. When a litigant in a traditional court
proved that her or his spouse had been unfaithful, or had behaved with actionable
cruelty, or had failed (in some junsdictions) to provide adequate support, the court
had no choice but to grant a divorce. Even if the judge believed that the marriage
could be saved; even if the children would suffer terribly from the dissolution;
even if, in fact, the marriage had not broken down, the divorce decree must issue.
Alexander considered this mandatory grant of a divorce upon59 proof of specific
grounds to be the worst corruption of American divorce law
He agreed with the liberals that divorce grounds were a wretched substitute for
marital breakdown. He proposed to eliminate all grounds. But Alexander would
take an eraser to the statutory code in order to give the court discretion to deny
divorce even in cases of adultery, cruelty or nonsupport. As a sociologist wrote
in support of Alexander's theories, the concept of divorce justice should satisfy

55.
56.

Id.
Paul W Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family Court, 21 Mo.

L. REV 105, 107 (1956) [hereinafter Alexander, Legal Science].
57 Id.
58. Paul W Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the Trenches, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 98 (1953) [hereinafter Alexander, Embattled Spouses].
59. Paul W Alexander, Introduction.in DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at
vi-vii (The fault system "compel[s] the judge to grind out divorces regardless of the real facts, the
underlying causes and the effect upon the parties, their families and the state."). Alexander also
focused criticism on those who "would make of the law a set of dehumanized, mechanzed rules,
and of the court a human slot machine: in goes the petition; wheels whir, out pops the decree."
VIRTUE, supra note 38, at xxxiv.
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the real need of troubled families: not a ruling on the lawfulness of conduct, but
"having the family members brought into a working relation to each other. ''W
IV DIVORCE As FARCE
But "a working relation" was far from the intent or yield of the divorce
process. The SaturdayEvening Post related the story of a Nevada legislator who,
allegedly in jest, proposed a bill for slot-machine divorce. His device would
automatically produce a divorce decree when fed 200 silver dollars. The
mechanism would also light up like a pinball machine and play a joyous tune to
celebrate the customer's freedom. The bill died.6i New York divorce litigants,
whose adultery-only law rendered useless the facile fables of cruelty, specialized
in "hotel" perjury State trial judge Henry Clay Greenberg admitted to the readers
of the American Magazine that the great bulk of Empire State divorces were
obtained fraudulently, "and almost everybody in the courts is aware of it." 62
Greenberg estimated that three-quarters of the cases were staged, with the average
performance lasting eight to ten minutes. 3 Divorce judges felt bound to play
their part, "caught in a system which, whatever the hypocrisy, is popular with a
large segment of the bar and the public."
The wry flavor of New York
divorcing was captured by the following exchange between Time magazine and
a Brooklyn matrimonial lawyer.6 5 The magazine had reported on the certainties
of New York divorce jurisprudence:
Occasionally, the pajamas are green instead of pink, but there are always pajamas
and the woman is always blonde. Discontented New York wives shrink from the
hoary tale, but the state law which permits divorce only on grounds of adultery
leaves them no alternative. Chief sufferers are referees in divorce proceedings,
forced to hear over & over the same old story of raid, surprised husband, pajamaclad blonde."
But attorney Joseph Horowitz took sharp exception to Time's description of the
certainties of divorce practice and its mindless repetition. In his experience
handling divorce trials in New York:
[N]ever has Madam X of the story been a blonde, never has she worn pajamas,
never has a wife shrunk from the hoary tale. She has been "brown-haired," "red-

60. Earl Lomon Koos, Family Problems and the Court, 287 ANNALS 27, 28 (May 1953)
(emphasis omitted).
61. Wittels, supra note 45, at 135-38.
62. Henry Clay Greenberg, New York's PerjuryMills, 144 AM. MAG. 46, 46 (1947).
63. Id. at 146.
64. Id. Greenberg did note that a finding of adultery effectively disqualified someone from
public office, and he expressed his sense that prevaricating witnesses felt guilty and insecure long
after the event Id. at 147
65. Full Dress, TIME, Feb. 11, 1935, at 16.
66. Id.
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haired," "light-haired," "dark." She has wom a "blanket," "black lace step-ms,"
"dancing tights," "panties," "white nightgown," or "nothing." New York wives
have not shrunk-most of them have laughed out loud. 7

Trial judge Paul Bonynge admitted in a published opinion that Empire State
courts spawned "thousands of divorces annually upon the stereotyped sin of the
same big blonde attired in the same black silk pajamas. ' 5 Discrepancies about
the color of the professional co-respondent's hair and underclothes accentuated
the uniformity of perjury New York had, in short, reversed the presumptions of
the formal system. The rare judge who refused to accept the faked hotel evidence
would "not be long hearing divorce cases."' Perjury was the common coin of
connubial freedom. In this Gresham's law of divorce, false testimony displaced
the true because the effective lie was more valued by all sides. As Paul
Alexander quipped, "the smoothest perjurer is soonest rewarded."'7
The
Michigan divorce judge who opened morning heanngs in uncontested cases by
intoning, "Let the perjury begin," understood the strictly symbolic character of the
courtroom rituals.'I
Perhaps the highest level of farce was revealed m an experiment conducted by
the Cleveland Press. Reporter Leonard Hammer submitted a bogus divorce
petition in the name of Richard Campbell (the newspaper's make-up editor) and
his wife. Hammer notarized the petition with a stamp conveniently left around
the Cleveland court house and shoved it into a pile of similar documents on Judge
Samuel Silbert's desk. No proceedings were held in the case, and no evidence
was ever presented. Nevertheless, six weeks later Judge Silbert-who handled
up to fifty divorce cases a day-entered a decree granting the Campbells a
divorce. When the ruse was exposed, Judge Silbert cited the participants for
contempt and fined the newspaper $1000. The Campbells were refused a marnage license in Cleveland and had to dnve to Indiana to get married again. In
a system which operated on the proposition that all couples consented to divorce,
the Campbells stood out because they were only pretending.72

V THE THREAT OF GENDERED EMANCIPATION
Men and women evolved toward greater individualism at a distinctly different

pace. Women's solo efforts continued to receive more criticism, and conservative
67 Laughung Ladies, TIME, Feb. 2:, 1935, at 6 (letter to the editor).
68. Reed v. Littleton, 289 N.Y.S. 798, 800-01 (1936).
69. Rheinstem, supra note 39, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE, supra note 39, at 41.
70. Paul W Alexander, Family Life Conference Suggests New Judicial Procedures and
Attitudes Toward Mamage and Divorce, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 38, 40 (Aug. 1948)
[hereinafter Alexander, Family Life].
71. Victor J. Baum, Law and Social Work: Marriage Counseling,A Case in Point, 3 J. FAM.
L. 279, 283 (Fall 1963). See Moms Ploscowe, The Failure of Dworce Reform, 13 OHIO ST. L.J.
3 (1952).
72. See Wittles, supra note 45, at 135-38 (recounting the incident); Henry Noble Hall, Easy
Does It, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1949, at 53 (same).
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critics of the perceived regression of society targeted women's liberties as the loss
leader of cultural degeneration.
Blaming women for societal ruptures was a common theme of hackneyed
humor. In a law school address on the mterprofessional approach to family
problems, a college professor asked his audience to recall that "the good Lord
made the Heaven and the Earth and Man in six days and rested. Then he made
women and neither man nor God has rested since."" He also alluded to the
movement for "Women's Sufferage [sic], the chief effect of which seems to be
men suffering."'74 Seriously-intended essays often scored the same points. In
a series of widely read articles in Collier's just after World War II, Ralph S.
Banay sedulously argued the case that women's refusal to accept their biological
destiny resulted in increased female criminality and schizophrenia."
Dr. Banay, the Research Director in Social Deviations at Columbia University,
had formerly been the Chief Psychiatrist at New York's Sing Sing Prison.
Interpreting the drive for female emancipation in psychopathological terms, he
claimed that women's "Stone Age" emotions-including a natural proclivity for
sadism and masochism-stemmed from a nature no more sophisticated than that
of "preadolescent children." Women's developmental jejunacity constituted for
Banay a recapitulation of preadamite courtship rituals. He observed that women's
"almost instinctual fascination with danger and horror would seem to be a
vestigial remembrance of the thrill and danger of the ancient hunts in which
women were captured and subdued." 76
In "The Husband Really Pays," Banay vigorously attacked what he considered
the overly-generous allowance of alimony to women. He saw the consequences
of divorce as grossly uneven: women revelled in placing men in the "penal servitude" of alimony, while men endured the fall-out of deeper alienation and ostracism after divorce. Real women were repelled by the concept of female equality,
Banay asserted, since "most normal women reveal in their dreams and fantasies
that they wish to be swayed, overwhelmed and mastered by their men."' ri These
desires
for subordination further replicated the immutable tendencies of the spe78
cies.
Within modem mamage, women's "emotional cannibalism" caused them to
assert their independence by "devour[ing] their husbands."79 Banay divided
troublesome women into three types. The "engineering" wife allowed her spouse
no voice in running the household. The "prima-donna" wife pursued her
obsession with her own ambition and pleasure. But the "competing" wife caused
the greatest havoc. Her insistence on her own career and refusal to "live her
73.

W Clark Ellzey, Marrageor Divorce? 22 U. KAN. CrrY L. REV. 9, 10 (1953).

74. Id.at 11.
75. Ralph S. Banay, How to Devour Your Husband, 122 COLLIER'S 16 (1948); Ralph S.
Banay, The Husband Really Pays, 119 COLLIER'S 18 (1947); Ralph S. Banay, The Trouble With
Women, 118 COLLIER'S 21 (1946).
76. Banay, The Trouble with Women, supra note 75, at 21, 74, 79.
77. Banay, The Husband Really Pays, supra note 75, at 97-98.
78. Id.
79. Banay, How to Devour Your Husband, supra note 75, at 16-17
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ambitions vicariously
reduce[d] her husband to the role of economic and
emotional midget."'
Banay's sexual pogrom did not go unchallenged. A flurry of articles and
letters to the editor attacked Banay for "purposely distort[ing] women's desires
and aims"a' and called upon Collier's to "secure competent psychiatric therapy"
for the psychiatrist himself. 2 One letter writer guessed that Banay's misogynous
razor had been sharpened on his own romantic misadventures: "Poor, dear Dr.
Banay' I bet she was a pip!"'3
But the tenor of attacks on modern women revealed Banay as outspoken but
not outdated. The editors of Collier's remarked that the hundreds of letters
generated by Banay's imtial article divided on purely gender lines in praising or
panning his sentiments.' Banay's call for severely limiting alimony received
support from correspondents who agreed in questioning why the husband should
"pay alimony so his former wife can live on Easy Street."85 Attacks on alimony
often achieved an execrating tone, entirely out of kilter with alimony's economic
impact. That this displaced sexual hatred was exhibited not only by men
indicated that sometimes both sexes feared the shifting nature of marriage in the
post-war era. Alimony served as the white-hot focus of a much larger cultural
argument, one that has not yet been satisfactorily resolved.
Many men-as well as a not insignificant number of women-perceived
alimony as a windfall for recipients and a crushing burden on those forced to pay.
Statistics showed, however, that alimony was decreed nation-wide in only onequarter of divorce cases, and that most awards were modest and often
incorporated sums for child support." In 1952, Chicago jurist Edwin Robson
noted that wives in the Second City waived alimony in nnety-three percent of the
cases.8 7 Five years later, Los Angeles Divorce Commissioner C. Clinton Clad
reported in the Saturday Evening Post that alimony awards averaged $35 per
month, a figure which he asserted was in line with awards across the country 88
The popular image of huge alimony assessments, Clad wrote, owed its provenance
to Park Avenue and Hollywood on the brain: "Almost daily one reads that this
socialite got a multimillion-dollar property settlement and that movie star is
asking for several thousand a month alimony However, these cases are terribly

80.

Id.

81.

Slur on Women Answered By Our President,26 INDEPENDENT WOMAN 51,

51

(Feb. 1947).

82. The Week's Mail, 119 COLLIER'S 64 (Jan. 11, 1947).
83. The Week's Mail, 119 COLLIER'S 61 (Jan. 18, 1947). Commenting on the popular post-war
sport of debunking women's ambitions, one observer characterized Banay's writing as "tak[ing] out
his shotgun and let[tmng] go with both barrels." Harrison Smith, Woman, the Scapegoat, 30 SAT.
REV. LrrERAruR 18 (Jan. 18, 1947). See Kathryn Brummond, Are Wives People? 25
INDEPENDENT WOMAN 329 (Nov. 1946).
84. The Week's Mail, 119 COLLIER'S 61 (Jan. 18, 1947).
85. The Week's Mail, 120 COLLIER'S 4, 80 (July 19, 1947).
86. JACOBSON, supra note 7, at 126-28.
87. Edwin A. Robson, The Law and Practice of Divorce: The Judge's Point of View, in
CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE, supra note 39, at 3-8.
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rare.
In the run-of-the-mill cases, particularly if there are children, the woman
rarely receives an adequate award." 9
The brouhaha raised by many men over alimony was also ironic since most
support payments represented negotiated settlements rather than orders imposed
by a judiciary somehow overcome by damp eyelashes and a clutched
handkerchief. In a world where the supply and demand of divorce fluctuated
rather freely, the amount of support generally represented the "comparative
eagerness of the spouses to dissolve the marnage."'9 When the husband was the
partner more desirous of the split, the wife could drive the support figure higher
as her price for cooperating. Conversely, when the wife was the moving party,
the support tally was "often just as little as the husband's attorney feels she can
' 91
be given without having the court question the validity of the agreement. "
Custody of children was similarly bargained for, both in terms of the custody
issue itself, and with regard to the amount of corresponding support.92
Most commentators were uninterested in the social facts. They preferred to
relate individual horror stones of long-suffering men either in alimony jails or too
poor to remarry, while their bloodthirsty ex-wives feted themselves on the spousal
dole.93 In his New York Herald Tribune column, Art Buchwald parodied this
trend by inventing a magazine feature article headlined, "How I Invested My
Alimony and Made a Million Dollars."'94 Although it also read like parody, the
sub-head of one abolitionist proposal earnestly described alimony as a "medieval
hangover [which] robs men,
turns women into drones, promotes greed and
5
damages innocent lives."'
89. Id. See C. Clinton Clad, The Economics of Divorce, 37 PHi DELTA DELTA 14 (June 1959).
See generally Kingsley Davis, How Much Do We Know About Divorce, 19 LOOK 65 (July 26, 1955)
(remarking on the modest scope of alimony orders); Dan Hopson, Jr., The Economics of a Divorce:
A Pilot Empirical Study at the Trial Court Level, 11 KAN. L. REv. 107 (1962) (noting that the
"news value of the large divorce settlement produces the American myth of the 'bleeding' husband
and the successful peroxide blond who now can vacation in Miami," after conducting a field study
in Kansas divorce courts); John Bartlow Martin, Divorce: The Depths ofScandal, 231 SAT. EVE.
POST 44 (Nov. 15, 1958) (noting a 1955 study that reported that the national monthly median child
support award was $17.39 per child).
90. Harret F Pilpel & Theodora S. Zavm, Separation Agreements: Their Function and
Future, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 35 (1953).

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., James Lincoln Collier, Time to Give DivorcedMen a Break, 96 READER'S DIG.
64 (Feb. 1970); Alexander Eliot, Let's Abolish Alimony, 237 SAT. EVE. POST 12 (Aug. 22, 1964);
Norman M. Lobsenz, Are Divorce and Alimony Unfair to Men? 75 READER'S DIG. 193 (Oct.
1959); Morrs Ploscowe, Alimony, 383 ANNALS 13 (May 1969). Harangues about alimony were,
of course, not new. In 1934, New York City Magistrate Jonah Goldstein had complained of
alimony's unfairness since the "man pays and pays and pays, although the wife in the meantime
is earning funds." JONAH GOLDSTEIN, THE FAMILY IN COURT 83 (1934). See Anthony M. Turano,
The Alimony Racket, 29 AM. MERCURY 237 (June 1933).
94. Art Buchwald, How I Invested My Alimony and Made a Million Dollars, HERALD
TRIBUNE, reprintedin Art Buchwald, The Seven Year Itch, 90 AM. MERCURY 76 (Feb. 1960).
95. Eliot, supra note 93, at 12-16. Even an otherwise balanced account in a standard 1950s
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Alexander Eliot advised women to "resist the degrading temptation to suck
blood from a man who loved you once."' In response to the article, a
representative of United States Divorce Reform, Inc. congratulated the Saturday
Evening Post for its devotion to the cause of alimony reform.97 Similarly, Sally
L. Underhill praised Eliot for denouncing the "licensed extortion practiced by
women too lazy to earn their own living."98
During the long process of converting California from a traditional divorce state
to the first exclusively no-fault American jurisdiction in 1969, the only allegations
of sex-based inequality were made by divorced men who "charged that husbands
were victimized and subjected to fmancial rum by wives in divorce
proceedings." 9" Not only did United States Divorce Reform, Inc. address the
issue of gender equality at the California legislative hearings (the only
organization to do so), it also attempted to qualify an initiative for the 1966
California ballot which would have removed jurisdiction over divorce and
ancillary matters from the courts, placing issues such as alimony in the hands of
an "Administrative Department of Family Relations.""
Alimony reform became a cause c6l~bre for divorced men and for the women
who married them. "Fathers Umted for Equal Rights" spawned the "Second
Wives Coalition" as a separate sister organization.'0° A lobbying group calling
itself "The Other Woman, Ltd." sponsored a fund-raising advertisement pitched
at divorced men.'0 2 The copy read: "Send us $1 to help get your ex-wife a
job. Or a husband." ' 3 A cartoon appeared underneath, depicting an ex-wife
munching chocolates as she watched television."
Rebuttals were muted. "D.P" claimed not to know any women living on
alimony but to know many who supported children without any help from their
ex-husbands.' 05 For Chicago judge Thaddeus V Adesko, alimony was a losing
proposition all around, "not enough for her and the kids, and
too much for
him to pay. '" 6 Indeed, the tail of the dismal payment record wagged the dog
of the awards themselves. A field study of Kansas divorces reported one judge's

sociology textbook devoted the bulk of its discussion on the subject to "alimony careerists,"
excessive awards and women who take savage delight in having ex-spouses imipnsoned for failure
to pay alimony. RAY E. BABER, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 480-84 (1953).
96. Eliot, supra note 93, at 12-16.
97. Letters to the Editor 237 SAT. EVE. POST 8 (Sept. 19, 1964).
98. Id.

99. Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV 1, 30 n.129 (1987).

100. Id. at 33.
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102. Id.
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sense that since alimony "is almost impossible to collect[,] there is not much
reason to grant it."'"7 Even as well-informed an expert as family law specialist
Henry H. Foster, Jr. crafted a skewed balance in his presentation of the issue.
Foster argued that, except for the "zealous fenmnst[s]," Americans "must be [as]
shocked by the number of unrealistic and unfair alimony awards" as by the
"chronic breakdown in their collection."i't
As if to stress that "alimony drones" were unrepresentative of their sex, the
popular journals continued to iterate the supposed feminine passion for
submission. Woman's quest for dependence supposedly reached all the workaday
comers of her life. Margaret Case Harmman considered it a "pretty canny
observation" that "woman's best reason for getting marned is to have somebody
around the house to explain newspaper items to her and to tell her how to
vote."" ° Harriman conceded that women were self-sufficient for life's major
[to] put that
concerns, but day-to-day hassles required "something in trousers
mysterious male power to work" and get things done. "
Girls flaunting their lack of discipline, mothers unsexing their sons and wives
emasculating their husbands: these accusations positioned woman once again as
the storm center of cultural change. Large segments of America, both male and
female, felt that pushing the limits of women's economic opportunities and social
outlook carried too many risks. But how could the clock be turned back? One
avenue of hope for the triumph of the nostalgic dream over the unrooted future
pointed to divorce reform. Marital breakdown was the lightning rod in the sexdriven cultural storm. In many ways, woman's worst sin was leading the charge
to the divorce court. As Hamson Smith concluded, "we are trying to find a
scapegoat for the failure of marriage, the awesome tide of divorce and annulment,
and there woman stands, the obvious center of all of man's emotional
disturbances."'
VI. THE SOCIAL CONTROL ORIGINS OF THE FAMILY CoURT

The lessons learned by the merger of legal compulsion and social science
expertise in the juvenile court were not lost on those who sought to expand the
court's jurisdiction to the whole range of failing families. As early as 1917, the
National Probation Association adopted a resolution recommending the
organization of "family courts" on the juvenile court model. Such courts were
expected to discourage "legal formality and delay" while encompassing "ample
107.

Hopson, supra note 89, at 125.
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Henry H. Foster, Jr., Spadeworkfor a Model Divorce Code, 1 J. FAM. L. 11, 21 (1961).

109. Margaret Case Harrman, Woman Needs Man, 122 GOOD HOUSEKEEPING 41,249-51 (May
1946).
110. Id. See Smith, supra note 83, at 18 (describing MARYNiA F FARNHAm & FERDINAND
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contribution" to the debate in the authors' view of feminism as "an aberration dangerous to society
and fatal to women.'). Even loquaciousness was dangerous during this thermidonan reaction. See
Richard Attndge, Do Women Have to Talk So Much? 219 SAT. EVE. POST 124 (June 28, 1947).
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probation departments" as well as "psychopathic labs sufficiently equipped to
conduct the necessary scientific investigations.""'
During the inter-war penod, the reformers' faith in social science experts
increased as their trust in the traditional legal system eroded even further. The
new institution they dreamed of would dispense with the "traditional furnishings
of the usual court room," disregard "customary legal procedure" and, for that
matter, discourage lawyers from participating at all." 3 A completely revamped
court needed a new name, such as the "Bureau of Family Adjustment '"" 4 or, to
use Ben Lindsey's utopian and anti-bureaucratic phrase, the "House of Human Welfare.. ' ..
Many attributes of the envisioned family tribunal were appropriated directly
from the earlier court's renovations. Juvenile court judges had almost
immediately redesigned the courtroom to de-emphasize legalism. Adopting an
extremely loose chancery procedure, the children's court bypassed traditional legal
rules. As for the antipathy toward lawyers, Minnesota juvenile court judge Grier
Orr exulted that in his courtroom, "lawyers do not do very much
and I do not
believe I can recall an instance where the same attorney came back a second time;
he found it was useless for him to appear.... 6 In Quintin Johnstone's
estimation, lawyers were "generally so uninformed on juvenile court methods and
juvenile care facilities that they [could] perform no important function in
delinquency cases. ' 7 In discussing the ideology of the juvenile court, historian
David J. Rothman noted that disregard for the amenities of common law
disposition was a positive value for the reformers. He remarked:
[In] almost every anecdote that judges or other proponents recounted about the
workings of the court, a gentle and clever judge persuaded a stubborn or recalcitrant
offender to "fess up," to tell the truth. Obviously this represented not a violation
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of the individual's right against self-incrimination but the first step of the delinquent
toward rehabilitation."

The same impatience for procedural niceties characterized the advocates of
therapeutic divorce, who frequently pooh-poohed concerns about the use of
coercive procedures in family courts. The sainted end of preserving the central
institution of American life justified the tainted means of dishonest therapy and
devious social control. The reformers justified their deviation from the canons
of Anglo-American litigation standards in two ways. First, they soft-pedalled the
coercive aspects of therapeutic divorce, insisting on such oxymorons as "gentle
judicial coercion." Second, they pointed out that the traditional legal canons had
failed to save mamages, and the family court represented a new beginning in
domestic relations law

19

Authority in the family courts would not lie in the musty tomes of precedent
but in the fresh face of science. The divorce petition "needs to be interpreted as
an expression of social difficulty which calls for expert help."' 20 In the
operation of the family court, Alexander proposed handing the scalpel to
therapeutic professionals, thus jettisoning not only the party-driven adversary
process but also the reliance on case precedent and judicial review
No possible guidance could be derived from the rule elucidation and factual
exploration of prior cases: therapeutic divorce would deal with each case as a
new individualized reclamation project. By the same token, appellate review
would be rendered superfluous. Either the parties would have received the
divorce they initially requested, or they would have reconciled. The work of a
family court would, in any event, not be appealed.
Although judges would still preside over the new court, their internal command
would be markedly circumscribed. A modem judge, proclaimed a New York City
magistrate, "must know how absurd it is for any human being to substitute his
own opinions and assumptions for the professional findings of experts. ' ' i
"When knowledge in fields other than the law is necessary to reach an intelligent
those who are expert in them should be permitted to have a deciddecision, only
1
ing voice."

In the words of a modem student of the twentieth-century expansion of state
the impact
power, this "casual attitude toward therapeutic power suggest[ed]
of science-as-ideology ",12 Confidence in the benevolent power of experts,
whether in social science, medicine or psychology, characterized the American
posture toward all social problems. Scientific techniques were believed to "inhabit[] a world that was beyond popular passions.' ' 2 4 The new reliance on science
ROTHMAN, supra note 12, at 216.
119. See KOOS, supra note 60, at 27-33 (discussing the "minor" role anticipated for lawyers in
family courts).

118.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

GROVES, supra note 115, at 223.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 93, at 191.
Id. at 213.
POLSKY, supra note 11, at 55.
MAY, supra note 14, at 26.
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trumped traditional mores in fields as far apart as child rearing and constitutional
interpretation. Benjamin Spock's Baby and Child Care reflected an elevation of
scientific sense over customary nostrums.2 5 And the Supreme Court's
declaring school segregation unconstitutional in 1954 owed more to social science
studies than to a nuanced review of precedent.' 2 Judge Alexander's family
a piece with a culture in which experts "took over the
court was fundamentally2 of
7
role of psychic healer.'
VII. THE PATHOLOGY OF DIVORCE
In place of divorce law's guilt-or-innocence dichotomy, Alexander and his
allies substituted the paradigm of mental illness. Divorce-seekers were sick.
They had come to the robed marriage doctor, whom society had equipped with
the right tools and consulting specialists to decide upon the appropriate treatment.
The injured person certainly should not self-diagnose, nor prescribe the needed
remedy, because expert guidance was essential. Alexander insisted on a medical
of his shattered
analogy' "though pain drives [the patient] to demand amputation
2
leg, the surgeon won't amputate if the leg can be repaired."'
Moreover, those in conjugal crisis were generally unaware both of the
opportunities for expert assistance and of their particular need for professional
relief. Since divorce was symptomatic of illness-the divorced were "children,
spoiled and stunted in development" 29 -the ultimate aim was to improve the
procedure so as to remove the pathology As John H. Mariano emphasized, "We
do not pass laws against disease; we strive to eradicate disease."'
Despite his benevolent utterances calling for the avoidance of guilt and sin,
Paul Alexander aimed to shift the debate from procedural rights in divorce cases
He believed that "tactful,
to "selfishness, sinfulness, [and] immaturty ''
gentle and persistent persuasion can induce even the most prideful or willful or
belligerent spouse to talk frankly and freely ,,32 Once these miscreant spouses

125.
126.

BENJAMIN SpocK, THE COMMON SENSE BOOK OF BABY AND CHILD CARE
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.tI (1954).

(1946).

127 VEROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 194.
128. Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, supra note 48. In the words of Edmund Bergler,
"divorce is n general a neurotic procedure of neurotic people." Edmund Bergler, Six Types of
Neurotic Reaction to a Husband's Requestfor a Divorce, 8 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 81 (1946).
See generally Stanton L. Ehrlich & Charles E. Sproger, X-ray of Divorce-Recent Developments,
1962 U. ILL. L.F 601 (1962) (arguing that 'legal patients' with marital problems should not selfdiagnose).
129. Emily H. Mudd, The Social Worker's Function in Divorce Proceedings, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP PROBS. 66, 70 (1953).
130. JOHN H. MARIANO, A PSYCHOANALYTIC LAWYER LOOKS AT MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
at Preface (1952). See generally Alexander, Legal Science, supra note 56.
131. Alexander, Family Life, supra note 70, at 40.
132. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

released their neurotic hold on the obsession of divorce,
33 Alexander believed, they
would be open to the desirability of reconciliation.
Troubled marital partners were impulsive, pursuing divorce out of an
"immature" and "infantile" inability to cope.' 3 Proponents of therapeutic
divorce repeatedly stressed the vulnerability and uncertainty of those poised, as
it were, at the precipice of divorce.

The working hypothesis of therapeutic

divorce was forcefully stated by Nester C. Kohut: "A substantial number of
marriages alleged by the parties and supposed by the attorneys and divorce courts
to be broken, lifeless or Irreparable, are not in fact completely or irreversibly

broken."' " Kohut, a marriage counselor, sociologist and lawyer, was the
director of "Save the Mamage, Inc." He argued that incompatibility and
voluntary separation need not lead to divorce. Assertions of cruelty should not
be taken at face value, and deserting spouses should be tracked down. All in all,
[with]
Kohut felt that American society had a "tendency to oversympathize
a distraught spouse.' ' 6
The belief in divorce as liberating was a manifestation of mental instability and
an unresolved oedipal complex. In the words of John S. Bradway, "the domestic
sufferer often is content, consciously or otherwise, to 'kill' his family "'137
Equating divorce with personal freedom indicated a neurotic deviation which, if
unchecked, could lead to the destruction of a critical social institution.

The

aberrant mental state of the divorce-minded was repeatedly underscored. A
Richmond, Virginia chancery judge advised matrimonial lawyers to remember that
they were "not advising a client who is in a normal state of mind.
Anger and

133. Id. See generally Paul W Alexander, What is a Family Court,Anyway7 26 CONN. B. J.
269 (1952).
134. MARIANO, supra note 130, at 173 (chapter entitled "Mixig Chronological Years and
Maturity Years').
135. NESTER C. KOHUT, A MANUAL ON MARTIAL RECONCILIATIONS: A SOCIO-LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF DIVORCE FOR THE UNBROKEN MARRIAGE 11 (1964). See Paul W Alexander, A
Therapeutic Approach, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE, supra note 39, at 51-52 (submitting that
complainants and their counsel automatically--and often incorrectly--assure the court's social
worker that the marriage is dead); Abraham Stone, Marital CounselingAs Aid To Legal Profession,
in DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 53-58 (reporting that many couples seeking
divorce act on impulse).
136. KOHUT, supra note 135, at 7. See Emily Marx, PsychosomaticsandJudicialSeparations,
20 FORDHAM L. REV. 84, 87 (1951) (discussing the medical invalidity of some complaints of
cruelty). Alice O'Leary Rails, supervisor of the family court of King County, Washington, believed
that at least half of divorce-filers "are really hoping that something will stop them before it is too
late." Alice O'Leary Ralls, The King County Family Court, 28 WASH. L. REV. 22, 26 (1953).
Some evidence to support Ralls' thesis may be found in the statistics of divorce dismissals. In
a Kansas field study, a group headed by Quintin Johnstone discovered that between 20 and 45%
of all divorce suits in the late 1940s and early 1950s were dismissed prior to trial, primarily due
to the reconciliation of the parties. However, the study also found that a large percentage of these
reconciliations were failures, with a consequent divorce. Quintin Johnstone, Divorce Dismissals:
A Field Study, I KANSAS L. REV. 245, 247 (1953) [hereinafter Johnstone, Dismissals].
137 John S. Bradway, Why Divorce? 1959 DUKE L.J. 217, 218.
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jealousy create a sudden psychosis
.' 13 The client in the grip of hatred and hurt
39
ill."
"mentally
was
pride
Through the method of therapeutic divorce, society carried out its obligation
to ensure that only the truly broken marriages were legally dissolved. All
others-and the expectations were high that a majority of present divorces would
be in this category--could be restored to health. The family court, not the
divorce-seekers, would decide when the marriage was beyond repair. Clearly
unsalvageable unions would be terminated quietly and quickly, without a public
trial and the necessity of proving grounds. But the marriages which science and
modem jurisprudence had brought back to health would redeem themselves
through reconciliation: "Even though a couple has diagnosed its own case as
hopeless, the judge would be able to draw upon the help of a body of counselors
representing religious, social, psychiatric and legal insights which might point the
way to reconciliation." 1" That the family court was a vessel in the command
of the therapeutic state was rendered plain in that the power to dissolve unions,
which several decades of litigious activity had operationally shifted to the individual couples, would now be reestablished as the prerogative of the government.
The reliance on expert intervention to alter the dynamics of failing mamages
also led Alexander and his cohorts to criticize living apart statutes. Laws
allowing for divorce after a set period of separation were "clinically unjustifiable"
because they "presuppose that distraught couples are the best judges as to the
viability of their marriage.". 4 They were also inappropriate because they
circumvented the family court's therapeutic approach.2 Living apart provisions were similar to fault grounds in terms of their amenability to proof. Once
a couple established the requisite separation period, the judge was obliged to grant
the divorce, even if she or he believed the couple could yet be reconciled.
Unhappy with the approximately 400,000 annual separation agreements which
dealt only with matters of custody, property division and support, and did nothing
to lessen the "rate of marital carnage," Nester Kohut proposed alternative
"Therapeutic Separation Agreements." These documents epitomized the reach of

138.

Brockenbrough Lamb, Ethical ConsiderationsAs Related To Divorce, in

DIVORCE AND

FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 42-45.

139. 1d. Cf generallyMane W. Kargman, The Lawyer as Divorce Counselor, 46 A.B.A. J. 399
(1960) (observing emotional intensity associated with divorce that did not necessarily result in a
more neurotic client).
140.

Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, An

Appeal for Change in Dealing with Divorce Problems (1952) (recommending scientific experts to
aim to "reorient and reeducate" spouses seeking divorce); HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 772
(Fowler Harper ed., 1952). See JOHN H. MARIANO, THE USE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY IN DIVORCE AND
SEPARATION CASES 70 (1958) (observing divorces resulting from "neglect in the treatment of
emotional ills").

141.

KOHIYr, supra note 135, at 52-54. Kohut clinched his point by remarking that a "patient

can hardly be his own physician!" Id. at 52. See Paul W. Alexander, Introduction, in DIVORCE AND
FAMILY RELATIONS,

supra note 18, at vi.

142. See generally Nester C. Kohut, Family Courts and SeparationStatutes: Correlatives or
Non-Correlatives, 4 J. FAM. L. 71 (1964).
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therapeutic divorce concepts, "demonstrat[ing] how the separation agreement can
be constructed so as to serve as a therapeutic
instrument, using experience from
43
the field of the behavioral sciences."'
In contrast to the "mundane economic" focus of most separation agreements,
these "therapeutic" instruments would emphasize the positive aspects of
separation, i.e., the opportunity and obligation to obtain counseling and plan
reconciliation. Kohut imagined that even separating parties still "desire[d] to
preserve their marital bond intact."'"
With the "passage of time" and
"professional mamage counseling," the parties' "feelings or perspective" toward
the separation might change. 45 The spouses agreed to do "whatever [was]
necessary" to try to save their marriage." The agreement contained specific
provisions for counseling, including the dates when the parties would "review in
earnest the status of their marital relationship by meeting
with or through
147 A specific
their respective attorneys, marriage counselors or clergymen."'
14
essential.
was
clause providing for future conciliation
However, just as couples should not separate without the guiding hand of legal
and behavioral experts, so too the beleaguered spouses should not attempt
"dangerous
unprepared reconciliations." " ' The beneficent apparatus of
legal and behavioral science was especially needed if the parties wished to end
their separation, since generally marital partners were "incapable and meffective
m resolving their differences by themselves."'"5 Distressed wives and husbands
who signed such agreements pledged to "steadfastly refrain" from a precipitous
reconciliation, especially if "for the sole purpose of satisfying sexual desires.""'
The therapeutic agreements aimed to help afflicted couples make "a success
52 of
their separation" by reconciling, but only under professional supervision.
Nor were incompatibility statutes acceptable to the advocates of therapeutic
divorce. None of the states providing this ground had established adequate
mechanisms to investigate the assertion of incompatibility. Even though some
appellate courts had tethered incompatibility to notions of fault, the easy pathway
to consent divorce allowed by the fault regime eviscerated this divorce alternative.
Moreover, therapeutic divorce champions believed that apparent incompatibility
inhered in every mamage, "and its emergence is not so much a signal to quit as

143.

Nester C. Kohut, TherapeuticSeparationAgreements, 51 A.B.A. J. 756, 756 (1965). See

KoHuT, supra note 135, at 60; Kohut, Rehabilitation of Broken Marriages, 10 PRAC. LAW. 75
(1964).
144. Kohut, TherapeuticSeparationAgreements, supra note 143, at 759. See generallyWilliam
C. Boyden, Divorce Settlement Agreements, 39 ILL. BAR J.110 (1950).
145. Kohut, Therapeutic SeparationAgreements, supra note 143, at 759.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 760.
149. Id. at 758.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 759.
152. Id. at 760. Kohut envisaged that a temporary agreement on issues of custody and
maintenance would be appended to the therapeutic separation agreement. Id. at 759.
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the indication that the task of mutual adaptation is about to begin."' As with
living apart statutes, the divorce ground of incompatibility failed because it
bypassed the essential therapeutic commitment and allowed marriages to end
without expert consultation.
VIII.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW" BRAVE NEW WORLD

OR POTEMKIN VILLAGE?

The family court/therapeutic divorce movement blossomed quickly, bloomed
brightly then died abruptly This curious chronology may best be understood m
the context of a broader pattern of fitful integration of law and the social sciences.
The drive for Alexander's family courts garnered support so long as its call for
a merger of law and psychology remained novel, exciting and unexamined.
Therapeutic divorce rapidly lost momentum when its premises were finally held
up for review, and American society realized that it did not wish its judges to act
as mamage counselors, nor its psychologists to have judicial power.
Calls for interdisciplinary cooperation pervaded legal texts, law reviews and bar
association journals beginmng in the decade of World War II. "The temper of
the times," an Ohio trial judge observed, "is unquestionably favorable to
emphasizing the sociological aspects in domestic relations cases. Members of the
bench and bar must guide the application of this trend."" Sidney P Simpson
and Ruth Field stressed the "necessity for functionalism in the law, a
functionalism which must be implemented by the findings of social science" 5 5
Charles H. Leclaire assessed the goal of the enterprise as "improv[ing] the entire
marriage-family-divorce-sociological-legal relationship. ' 6 Prophets57 of disciplinary collegiality broadcast the identical message dozens of times.
153.

DAVID MACE, MARRIAGE 58 (1952).
154. Carl A. Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 735,
735 (1944).
155. Sidney P Simpson & Ruth Field, Law and the Social Sciences, 32 VA. L. REV 855, 856

(1946).
156. Charles H. Leclatre, Reform-The Law of Divorce, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV 380, 387-90
(1949).
157. For articles espousing cooperation between law and the social sciences published m legal
periodicals from the 1940s until the 1960s, see Allan Barton & Saul Mendlovitz, The Experience
of Injustice as a Research Problem, 13 J. LEGAL EDUc. 24 (1960); Paul Bohannan & Karen
Huckleberry, Institutionsof Divorce, Family, and the Law, I LAW & Soc'Y REV 81 (1967); Steuart
Henderson Britt, The Social Psychology of Law, 34 ILL. L. REV 802 (1940); Thomas A. Cowan,
The Relation of Law to Experimental Social Science, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 484 (1948); Samuel M.
Fahr & Ralph H. Ojemann, The Use of Social and BehavioralScience Knowledge in Law, 48 IOWA
L. REV 59 (1962); H.M. Fain, Role and Relationshipof Psychiatryto Divorce Law and the Lawyer
41 CAL. ST. B.J. 46 (1966); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law
ofIndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967); Roswell H. Johnson, Suppressed,Delayed,
Damagingand Avoided Divorces, 18 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 72 (1953); Stanford W Katz, A
Symposium on Mental Health Concepts in Family Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 61 (1967); Raphael LemkI,
Orphans of Living Parents: A Comparative Legal and Sociolegal View, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 834 (1944); Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences-especially Sociology, 62
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The clamor for interdisciplinary collaboration grew so vociferous, however, that
it emphasized the distance to be covered as much as the desire for professional
fusion. Paul Alexander acknowledged that the law "has traditionally shown

considerable reluctance to stray off its own reservation."s' For all of Karl
Llewellyn's advice that "it pays to be neighborly," ' cooperative efforts were
unimpressive in scope or number. Robert Kramer, a participant in the 1959
Institute of Family Law conference at Duke University, gauged the scholarly
outpouring with a skeptical eye: "Scarcely a year passes where a learned journal
of sociology or law, or whatever field you pick, fails to carry a brave article with
a manifesto that what we need is interdisciplinary6 research."'" Yet, Kramer
concluded, very few joint projects were attempted.
Four years later, a former
president of the Russell Sage Foundation admitted the rarity of "planned
cooperation" between behavioral scientists and lawyers, but insisted that a "good
start has been made. ''i 6i
In his provocative Why Lawyers Are Dissatisfied with the Social Sciences,

Samuel M. Fahr provided a philosophical and methodological basis for the
interdisciplinary unease. Although he addressed the particular tension between
law and social science in criminology, his remarks had broader application:
Fundamentally the social scientist is culturally oriented, and a man of statistics;
whereas the lawyer tends to look at matters from the standpoint of an individual
client. On the other hand, and herein lies the paradox, most social scientists seem
to focus on the criminal and not upon his act;63whereas the traditional approach of
the law has been to concentrate upon the act.

HARV L. REV. 1286 (1949); Julius H. Miner, Conciliation Rather Than Reconciliation, 43 ILL. L.
REV 464 (1948); Clarence Moms, Law, Reason and Sociology, 107 U. PA. L. REV 147 (1958);
David Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training, and Colleagueship, 9 STAN. L. REV
643 (1957); John C. Scanlon & Kenneth Weingarten, The Role of Statistical Data in the Func
tioning of the Courts, 12 BUFFALO L. REV 522 (1963); Richard D. Schwartz, The Law and
BehavioralScience Program at Yale: A Sociologist'sAccount of Some Experiences, 12 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 91 (1959); Philip Selzmck, Legal Institutions and Social Controls, 17 VAND. L. REV. 79
(1963); A.L. Tilton, Psychology, Psychiatry and Divorce, 28 MILWAUKEE B.A. GAVEL 12 (1968);
Andrew S. Watson, The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the Unversity of Pennsylvania:
A Psychiatriston the Law Faculty, 11 J. LEGAL EDUc. 73 (1958); J.E. Hall Williams, The Relation
of Social Work Philosophy to the Study and Practiceof Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 366 (1957); William
M. Wherry, Preventive Law and the Unstable Family, 21 N.Y ST. B.A. BULL. 401 (Oct. 1949);
Hans Zeisel, Uses ofSociology in the Professions: the Law, 15 U. CHI. L. ScH. REC. 6 (1967).
158. Paul W Alexander, Public Serice by Lawyers in the Field of Divorce, 13 01o ST. LJ.
13, 18 (1952).
159. Llewellyn, supra note 157, at 1305.
160. PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF FAMILY LAW 7 (John S. Bradway ed., 1959).
161. Id
162. Donald Young, The BehavioralSciences, Stability, and Change, 17 VAND. L. REV. 57, 62

(1963).
163. Samuel M. Fahr, Why Lawyers Are Dissatisfiedwith the Social Sciences, 1 WASHBURN
L.J. 161, 163 (1961). Sociologist Gilbert Geis responded to law professor Fahr m an article the
following year. Geis had to admit, however, that the Brown desegregation decision had intensified
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Communication between the disciplines was arduous enough; cooperative projects
proved intensely difficult to organize. Paul Alexander's plea that law and the
social sciences "get off our high horses, and bury our interprofessional jealousies"
was greeted with only surface affirmation.'"
A similar pattern of exploration and retrenchment can be seen in the treatment
of social sciences within legal education. The ideal of a law casebook developed
by Christopher Columbus Langdell and James Barr Ames m the late nineteenth
century continued to dominate until the middle of the twentieth century Among
domestic relations casebooks, this "pure" approach, devoid of all information but
that contained within appellate opinions, represented the norm. These texts,
or "The Law of .,"i65 contained no non-legal
usually labelled "Cases on
materials 1 6 and consisted simply of a selection of cases t67 thematically arranged. 6 These arid texts distilled the essence of the orthodox formalism of
family law
A rival approach developed at Columbia University in the late 1920s as a result
of extensive law faculty studies in legal education, which in turn had been
influenced by sociological jurisprudence and legal realism. Columbia law
Professor Albert C. Jacobs and University of Michigan sociologist Robert C.
Angell produced a report on family law teaching which called for a researchbased sociological approach. In 1933, Jacobs produced the first domestic
relations casebook on this new model, in which the cases were liberally interlaced
with sociological materials.'69

concern among some lawyers about the increasing encroachment of social science upon the legal
bailiwick. Gilbert Geis, The Social Sciences and the Law, I WASHBURN L.J. 569, 583-84 (1962).
164. Paul W Alexander, Foreword,22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV 1, 1 (1953).

165.

See, e.g., WILLLAM RANDALL COMPTON, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1951);

FREDERICK L. KANE, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1936); JOSEPH W MADDEN, CASES ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1928); WILLIAM E. MCCURDY, CASES ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, (4th ed. 1952); WILLIAM E. MCCURDY, CASES ON THE LAW or PERSONS
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1927); EPAPHRODITUS PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (1920); EPAPHRODITUS PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS OR DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1913).

166. See, e.g., JOSEPH W MADDEN & WILLIAM RANDALL COMPTON, CASES- AND MATERIALS
ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1940) (including in the title of the casebook the word "materials" despite
the absence of any nonlegal materials).
167. WILLIAM E. MCCURDY, CASES ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS at
vii (1927) (describing the textbook as a "collection of cases"). Nothing in his 1952 edition challenged that bland depiction.

168. The conceptual philosophy which specified that textbook authors were in the business of
tansmittmg received wisdom to students is exemplified in Frederick L. Kane's assertion that
"retaining [his] faith in the efficacy of the case system," he had "edited the cases as little as
possible." KANE, supra note 165, at iii.

169. ALBERT C. JACOBS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS INDOMESTIC RELATIONS (1933). See
Brainerd Cume, The Materials of Law Study, Part Three, Nonlegal Materials in the Law School
Beginnings of the Modern Integration Movement, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955) (detailing the shift
from pure casebooks to those with both "cases and materials"). See also Albert Ehrenzweig, The
American Casebook" "Cases and Materials," 32 GEO. L.J. 224 (1944).
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While subsequent editions of Jacobs' domestic relations text retained a
flavoring of sociological materials, the movement for integration passed by the
somewhat static originator, so that by the 1950s Jacobs' tome was referred to as
"a reasonably traditional law book." That decade saw the integration of law and
social science emerge as the "slogan of the day "170
But integration may not have passed the epigrammatic stage. An article m the
1950 Journalof Legal Education noted that the interdisciplinary focus "has been
attempted only in some of the 'progressive' schools.""' Elsewhere, the paucity
of faculty expertise and student interest had stalled the effort. Indeed, the 1961
edition of Jacobs' once-revolutionary casebook shifted from a law-and-society

focus to one of legal craft, with the result that sociological
studies, although
72

"[e]nlightemng," had to "yield place to technical matter."
A "second explosion" of social science information in casebooks was presaged
by Fowler V Harper's idiosyncratic Problems of the Family. 73 Harper split his
text roughly in half between legal materials and those drawn from anthropology,
sociology and psychiatry 17' The full flush of a new consciousness in domestic
relations texts amved with the 1960s, accompanied by the widespread, if belated,
realization that a family law practitioner "must
be something of a psychologist,
5
psychiatrist, sociologist, and negotiator."'"

Jacobs' first effort pleased many, but not all. See, e.g., Robert Angell, Book Review, 33 COLUM.
L. REV 1086 (1933) (criticizing Jacobs as not going far enough); Donald Slesinger, Book Review,
I U. CI. L. REv 659 (1934) (criticizing Jacobs as not adding the sociological materials well);
Chester Vernier, Book Review, 47 HARV L. REV. 732 (1934) (criticizing Jacobs as going too far).
170. See generally ALBERT C. JACOBS & JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1952); ALBERT C. JACOBS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS IN
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1939); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Teaching 'Integration -A Comment
on Law and Society, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1950); Robert Kingsley, Book Review, 5 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 400 (1953).
171. Ehrenzweig, supra note 170, at 359.
172. ALBERT C. JACOBS & JuLIUS GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS IN DOMESTIC
RELATIONS at ix (4th ed. 1961). In 1956, English scholar Otto Kahn-Freund ridiculed the case
teaching method as totally inappropriate: "To teach Family law in terms of 'case law,
is to act

like a professor of medicine who not only teaches pathology to students knowing nothing about the
anatomy of physiology of the healthy body, but who teaches pathology in terms of the rarest diseases." Otto Kahn-Freund, Observations on the Possible Cooperation of Teachers of Law and
Teachers of Social Science in Family Law, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1956).
173. Francis A. Allen, History, Empirical Research, and Law Reform: A Short Comment on
a Large Subject, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 335 (1956). PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY, supra note at 140.
Harper's impressiomstic shuffling of materials from radically different sources resulted in a deck
seen as too stacked in favor of the social sciences. See Robert J. Levy, The Perilous Necessity:
Non-Legal Materialsin a Family Law Course, 3 J. FAM. L. 138, 151 (1963) (criticizing the editor's
integrative effort for giving "such short shrift to many of the essentials of an introduction to the
lawyer's technical tasks that its utility to a group of law students was questionable").
174. See PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 140.
175. MORRIS PLOSCOwE & DORIS JONAS FREED, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at ix
(1963). For other representatives of the second explosion in domestic relations, see JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN & JAY KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW' PROBLEMS FOR DECISION IN THE FAMILY
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This background helps us understand the ambivalent relationship between law
and science in the middle decades of this century. While American society
steadily yielded increasing acreage to the claims of science, the legal profession
sported a more complex attitude, "simultaneously skeptical and unbelievably
gullible" about the authority of social science and the nature of the
accommodation required of the law 176 This uncertain attitude shaped the
history of divorce and the family court.
IX. HONEST AND DISHONEST DIVORCE

National attention was focused on therapeutic divorce by the Report of the
Legal Section of the National Conference on Family Life presented at the White
House m May 1948. Paul Alexander had been joined in developing the report by
Reginald Heber Smith, the grand old warrior of the Legal Aid movement. Smith
had popularized
their findings a few months earlier in a widely cited article in the
177
Atlantic.
In "Dishonest Divorce," Smith did not mince words about the scope of the
problem: "In the whole administration of justice there is nothing that even
remotely can compare in terms of rottenness with divorce proceedings."' 78 He
asserted that divorce had spun crazily out of sync with society and must be controlled by a greater reliance on creative use of legal authority "The law," Smith
reminded his readers, "is the most powerful instrument for social control that
civilization has been able to evolve." 79 The weight of the law should,
however, support the agendas of non-legal experts, for the questions of broken
mamages and divorces were primarily social, economic, medical and spiritual in
nature. Smith pointed out that the investigations necessary to determine marital
viability could not be accomplished in a legal system in which practically all
divorces were uncontested. 8 '
Therapeutic divorce reformers often railed against the fault regime for allowing
one spouse to present, pro forma, the pre-arranged verdict agreed to by the
parties. Under the premises of the adversary system, the absence of one party
simply made it easier for the other to satisfy the burden of proof. Because
therapeutic divorce operated under entirely different suppositions, the attendance

(1965); CALEB FOOTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 769-95
(1966) (featuring the imaginative "Quadrilogue on Divorce Policy," a hypothetical discussion
involving a doctor, professor, judge and bishop).
176. Harry Kalven, Jr., Some Comments on the Law and Behavioral Science Project at the
University of Pennsylvania, II J. LEGAL EDUC. 94, 96 (1958).
177. Smith, supra note 34.
178. Id. at 43.
179. Id. at 42.
180. Id. at 44-45. For the significance of and publicity attached to the 1948 Report, see
Alexander, Family Life, supra note 70, at 38; Leclaire, supra note 156, at 387, 390; Dorothy
Thompson, Divorces Are Not Crimes: TheyAre Tragedies, 59 READER'S DIG. 117 (Nov. 1951).
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of both parties should be 18required in order to facilitate the mandatory
investigation and counseling. '
Judges should be "unshackled" and allowed to order social intervention more
aggressively since the law "steadily demonstrates a vital capacity to regulate life
18
As N. Ruth Wood argued in a 1949
in many of its aspects and activities.""
article in the Virginia Law Weekly, the divorce reforms were not intended to make
and to
divorce easier or more difficult, but "to substitute truth for deception
give the courts real opportunity to prevent marriage failures by conciliation and
treatment, rather than to restrict them to the punishment of such failures by
divorce."' 3
Belief in the impulsiveness and loss ofjudgment of would-be divorcers justified
the use of coercion, an ever-present element in therapeutic divorce. Since, in
Alexander's words, couples in conflict suffered from an "utter lack of insight"
into the factors underlying what they-often mistakenly-believed to be
u-reparable mamage breakdown, they needed the finn hand of a benevolent family
court to help them "think straight."'" Alexander brooked no recalcitrance in
his court: a family judge "should have ample authority for dealing with people
who seem to understand only the language of authority ""'s
While most therapeutic-minded judges aimed to render de minimis the lawyer's
role as an advocate in family court, Alexander took a different tack. An attorney
had an "indispensable" role as an "effective ally of the court in 'selling' the best
plan to his client."'8 6 Traditional advocacy, in Alexander's view, must be
subordinated to the call for therapeutic adjustment. The new ideology constrained
not only the court and its social science experts, but even private divorce lawyers,
shifting their loyalty to a new client, the state-ordered marital unit.
To this end, several proposals were made embodying radically different views
of the nature of advocacy and of the divorce hearing itself. John S. Bradway
suggested a shift away from proof of fault grounds to broader social questions.
At a divorce trial, the issues to be tried would include the following questions:
1. Why are these particular spouses unable to live amicably together as normal
mamed people do?

181. See E. Dana Brooks, PositiveApproach to the Divorce Dilemma, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 98-102.
182.

Smith, supra note 34, at 45.

N. Ruth Wood, Precepts of Modern Uniform Divorce Law, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS, supra note 17, at 103-07. In 1947, Wood had chaired a committee of the National
Association of Women Lawyers which had made reform proposals similar to those of Smith and
Alexander. But the Association had rejected their report as unlikely to be adopted by state legislatures. See Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, Our Scandalous Divorce Laws, 66 AM. MERCURY 272 (Mar.
1948).
184. Paul W Alexander, The Follies ofDivorce-A TherapeuticApproach to the Problem, 1949
U. ILL. L. FORUM 695, 699-700 [hereinafter Alexander, Follies of Divorce].
185. Alexander, Family Life, supra note 70, at 43.
186. Alexander, Follies of Divorce, supra note 184, at 710.
183.
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2. Will the parties be sufficiently better off m any demonstrable fashion after the
divorce than they were before?
3. How will the process of granting a divorce affect the security to which other
members of the group may be morally entitled?
4. Will some other solution than a divorce decree be more adequate to the particular
problems?'"

Another proposal replaced not only the nature of the issues to be tried but also
the composition of the jury Raphael Lemkin argued that divorce cases should
be tried to a panel containing experts from the behavioral sciences as well as "lay
people with experience m family life."' 88 The emphasis on the lawyer's
reorientation toward social work culminated in Bradway's proposal that the legal

profession develop a new specialty, the "family lawyer," whose client would be

the family as a whole, not any of its members. 9
At a 1952 conference on divorce law at the University of Chicago, Paul
Alexander defended his use of compulsory referrals for therapy m family court
cases by analogy to juvenile court practice. 90 Children did not always willingly
attend juvenile court and often had to be taken into custody by police. Despite
that coercive beginning, juveniles often benefitted from social case work. The
same procedure could work with divorce-minded adults. As Alexander had
earlier phrased it, with his customary directness, "we suggest handling our
91
unhappy and delinquent spouses much as we handle our delinquent children."'
Alexander dreamed of transforming the divorce court "from a morgue into a
hospital."" 92 This change would require a substantial revision of philosophy and
personnel. The philosophical milieu would, as noted above, copy the junspru-

187. John S. Bradway, Proposed New Techniques in the Law of Divorce: I.Family
Dissolution-Limits of the PresentLitigious Method, 28 IOWA L. REV. 262 (1943).
188. Lemkin, supra note 157, at 851-54.
189. John S. Bradway, A Suggestion: The Family Lawyer 45 A.B.A. J. 831, 866 (1959).
190. Alexander, A TherapeuticApproach, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE, supra note 39.
191. Alexander, Family Life, supra note 70, at 41. The pervasiveness of the therapeutic divorce
movement may be gleaned by the fact that every one of the published articles from the University
of Chicago's 1952 Conference dealing with law revision called for implementation of the therapeutic divorce program. See generally Thomas J. Cunningham, Education, Conciliation as Solutions
to Divorce, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 46; William J. Goode,
Compulsory Counseling,Prerequisiteto Divorce, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note
18, at 74; Dudley F Sicher, Comprehensive Divorce Court Needed, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 78; Dana Brooks, Positive Approach to the Divorce Dilemma, in
DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 98.
192. Alexander, Follies of Divorce, supra note 184, at 707. Alexander's penchant for medical
and specifically pathological metaphors was unceasing. He criticized writers who confused
mamage failure with divorce, comparing that error to a failure to distinguish between appendicitis
and an appendectomy. Alexander, Introduction, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note
18, at v. He complained of appearing as a "faintly glorified public mortician," because all he did
was "bury dead marriage"-irty thousand to date." Alexander, A Therapeutic Approach, in
CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE, supra note 39, at 51. And he greatly feared that he had "buried a lot
of live corpses." Alexander, Family Life, supra note 70, at 38.

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

dence of the juvenile court. The staff of the new family courts would expand to
include psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, social and psychiatric case workers
and marriage counselors.
But the most dramatic metamorphosis would have to occur within the judiciary
Case law specialists on the domestic relations bench would be replaced by judges
trained in and sensitive to a whole array of the social and medical sciences, from
community organization to psychiatry Traditional standards of judging, in which
the offense precedes rehabilitation, would be replaced by canons requiring
rehabilitation in an effort to prevent the commission of the offense of divorce.
Advocates of therapeutic divorce saw little conflict between coercion and
therapy In Alexander's view, the promise of a divorce procedure freed from
"guilt" and "sin" was worth the price of some judicial compulsion in the direction
of the preservation of the bedrock institution of American society But the
ultimate coercion, of course, was the vast increase in the power of the court.
Petitioners would not even be able to apply for a divorce without the court's
consent. Thus, divorce by mutual party consent (the de facto popular system)
would end. Moreover, a divorce decree would only be granted if the social
investigation, plus the court's own inquiry, "compelled the conclusion that the
marriage could no longer be useful to the spouses, the children, or the state."'
The discretion to grant new divorces brought with it the corresponding power
to deny old ones, even where the fault grounds had been satisfactorily established.
Recognizing the porous texture of fault and the reality of mutual consent, English
law Professor Otto Kahn-Freund insisted that "there are situations in which the
court must be able to say 'no though both spouses want a divorce."' On both
sides of the Atlantic, courts were gearing up to say "no" in new and more potent
ways. But some critics saw more than a nominal conflict between the canons of
marriage therapy and the directive strategy of the new family court. This clash
may be seen in the histories of some experiments in counseling and conciliation.
X. "GENTLE JUDICIAL COERCION"

Convinced of the purity of their goal and the benevolence of their methods, the
advocates of the therapeutic state proposed to sacrifice personal autonomy on the
altar of divorce reform. Sociologist Eugene Litwak, for instance, saw no role
conflict in the operational methodology of the family courts: "[The] basic
premise of law as therapy is that people seek divorce because of serious
emotional problems. Therefore, any legal procedure seeking to control divorce
But were therapy and
should provide that the -spouses see a therapist."'9

193. Alexander, Divorce Without, supra note 54 (emphasis added). See generally Milton L.
Grossman, How Can We Make Divorce Realistic? 23 N.Y ST. B. BULL. 350 (Oct. 1951) (echoing
this restrictive view).
194. Otto Kahn-Freund, Divorce Law Reform?, 19 MOD. L. REV. 584 (1956).
195. Eugene Litwak, Divorce Law as Social Control, 24 SOC. FORCES 217 (Mar. 1956) (noting
that law as therapy "focuses on internalization of societal values'), reprintedin NORMAN W BELL
& EZRA F VOGEL, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 208-17 (1960).
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compulsion compatible? A glimpse of the workings of the Los Angeles
conciliation court affords an opportunity to examine this issue in context.
As noted above, the conciliation court was the brain child of the redoubtable
Ben Lindsey.'9 Ever the heterodox, Lindsey believed in automatic divorce for
childless couples (who should practice birth control until they were certain they
want children), but was quite chary of granting the privilege after the family had
expanded. He once told a divorce-seeking couple that his court was "concerned
with the right of your children to you, rather than your right to your
children."' 97
The conciliation court was designed to work as a "pre-divorce" tribunal. A
wife or husband who found the marriage in jeopardy could file a petition for a
conciliation hearing. No divorce petition could then be filed for thirty days. In
the meantime, the court clerk notified the other spouse of the hearing. If she or
he ignored the notice, the court could compel attendance. From that point on,
however, participation was voluntary, although the pressure of early intervention
was aimed to induce the couple to cooperate with the court. In the words of a
reporter studying matrinmomal litigation, the Los Angeles conciliation court
represented the "farthest any American court has gone in the direction of forcing
couples to attempt a reconciliation before they may get a divorce."'98
Lindsey, who was seventy years old when the California legislature adopted his
plan for the conciliation court in Los Angeles, never served on it. The court
achieved its period of greatest influence under the leadership of Judge Louis H.
Burke in the 1950s. Key to Burke's operation was his development of a
comprehensive "reconciliation agreement" to be signed by the couple. As
described by one of Burke's successors, the agreement contained twenty-five
pages covering "practically every facet of manred life." Appended to the basic
agreement were up to eight special form agreements covering particularized items
such as the presence of third parties in the home, stepchildren, an agreement for
one of the spouses to attend Alcoholics Anonymous or the termination of an
extramarital romantic liaison.'"

196. See LOUIS H. BURKE, WITH THiS RING (1958); Louis H. Burke, The Role of Conciliation
in Divorce Cases, 1 J. FAM. L. 209 (1961); Louis H. Burke, The Conciliation Court ofLos Angeles
County, 40 CM. B. REC. 255 (1959); Lows H. Burke, An Instrument of Peace: The Conciliation
Court of Los Angeles, 42 A.B.A. J. 621, 690-91 (1956); Harry M. Fain, The Lawyer's Role in
Califorma Reconciliation Court Plan, in A.B.A., SEC. OF FAM. LAW, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 211
(1962); Paul Fnggens, The Walk-In Court That Rescues Rocky Marriages,81 READER'S DIG. 107
(Dec. 1962); Roger Alton Pfaff, The Conciliation Courtof Los Angeles County, in A.B.A., SEC. OF
FAM. LAW, 1960 PROCEEDINGS 35 (1960); Roger Alton Pfaff, A Court that Preserves Marriages,
37 PI DELTA DELTA 3 (1959); Lloyd Shearer, This Court Saves Foundering Marriages, 57
READER'S DIG. 119 (Aug. 1950); Frank J. Taylor, A CourtTo Prevent Divorce, 103 NEW REPUBLIC
239 (Aug. 19, 1940).

197.

Taylor, supra note 196, at 239-40.

198. John Bartlow Martin, Divorce: Effort to Save a Troubled Marriage,231 SAT. EVE. POST
36 (Nov. 8, 1958).
199. Pfaff, The Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 196.
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The onginal appointment letter, signed by the judge, contained the following
admonition to the summoned party- "We trust you will keep this appointment
voluntarily, and avoid the necessity of requirng the Court to issue a
subpoena."2" If the court succeeded in persuading the couple to attempt a
rapprochement, it would draw up a reconciliation agreement containing a series
of specific commitments about the couple's future behavior.
The terms of this contract (which included abundant sermonizing by the court)
provide a snapshot not only into the heart of therapeutic divorce but also into a
social system which the reformers were desperately trying to recapture. Couched
in the rhetoric of therapeutic divorce, the Los Angeles reconciliation agreement
is a fascinating social document which at one level points backward toward the
idyllic image of conservative utopia, while its very terms highlight the seeds of
family conflict which are about to explode any hope of restoring the institutional
family A typical reconciliation agreement opened with the couple's admission
that their marnage "has become sick" and that they "should go to a professionally
trained person for help." '' After these ideological mea culpas, the parties
formally agreed "that they will not accuse, blame or nag each other about things
which have happened in the past."2" 2
A reiteration of the gendered social order followed. The wife agreed that
housework, meal preparation, child care and maintaining the "inside of the home"
were her responsibilities. The husband took charge of financially supporting the
family in addition to canng for the "outside of the home." Despite a gesture
toward the existence of working women, noting that in those cases the husband
"must share to a larger extent in the work of the home," the task of sustaining the
traditional domestic order fell on the wife. Women who refused a dependent role
were "robbed of their full dignity" The inequality of the burdens is apparent in
the paragraph labelled, ironically, "Husband's Role in the Family"
It will always be true in marmage that the greatest giving will be required on the
part of the wife. Through pregnancy and child-raising she loses the independence
which the man continues to retain. When today we find a woman who is reluctant
to face the loss of such independence it is generally because she does not trust the
man to be loving, confident and considerate, particularly at the time when she must,
of necessity, depend solely upon him Generally speaking, a good woman is happy
to go through a great amount of sacrifice for her husband and family, as long as his
step is firm, his love tender and his faith in her and in himself is strong. 3

200. Meyer Elku7, Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration ofDisintegrating Families, 22 FAM.
COORDINATOR 66 (Jan. 1973).

201. See BURKE, WrrH THis RING, supra note 196, at app. 270-80 (including his customary
reconciliation agreement). See also Typical Reconciliation Agreement, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 207 (1955);
GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, supra note 175, at 146-50.
202. BuRKE, WITH Tius RING, supra note 196, at app.
203. Id.
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Other provisions m the agreement required a mutual effort to share interests
and hobbies, respect the privacy of each other's mail and avoid gambling,
excessive drinking and sarcastic language. The couple promised to make new
friends among other mramed couples, so as to remove themselves from the
unhealthy influence of their former circles of single friends. Conceding the
importance of religion, the couple agreed to attend church regularly and to recite
daily a family prayer. The document included rules for meal times, social
occasions, personal appearance and relationships with relatives. The husband
accepted his responsibility to take his mate out for social activities, within the
constraints of the family budget, at least once a week. Clauses relating to childrearing blended the sublime with the banal. After a preface pointing out that
there are "no dull moments in parenthood," the parents acknowledged that their
child is "the handiwork of God" and pledged to think and speak of the child as
"our" child, never as "my" child or "your" child. The enormity of the task of
child-reanng was brought home by the declaration that an "estimated
80
percent of what a child is, or turns out to be, is attributable directly to his
parents."2 " Numerous specific rules on discipline preceded a discussion of a
sound family relationslup based on obedience through love.
Wife and husband agreed to moderation m sexual intercourse, which was
spelled out as "twice a week" under "normal conditions," which were not spelled
out.205 The agreement contained a primer on the importance of "'lovemaking'
as a prelude to sexual intercourse" because of the different physiological
proclivities of each sex, which were explained in detail.' ° Oblivious to the
findings of Alfred Kinsey, the agreement limited its discussion to sexual
stereotypes, contrasting a man's sexual susceptibility to the "slightest stimulation"
with a woman's slow "passion side."2 7 For a woman, the agreement asserted,
"physical union
is out of the question until her physical desire is sufficiently
aroused and her glandular processes have prepared her body for such union." 8
Unless a woman "has been properly prepared," sexual intercourse will not bring
her "to the necessary climax and consequent release of nerve tension."'
The
husband was warned that "repeated acts of intercourse which do not result in
satisfaction for the wife become unpleasant."2 ' For her part, the wife agreed
"not to act like a patient undergoing a physical examination."' "
Conjugal sexuality thus reified the gendered universe. A wife was dependant
on her husband for the financial support of herself and the children, for her social
life and also for her own sexual satisfaction. Her sexual duty prior to conception
was not to get in her husband's way or behave as if she were on an awkward
gynecological visit.
204.

Id.
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Financial planning was not neglected. The wife was designated the family
treasurer. Each party agreed to a set amount of spending cash each week, whose
purpose was specified. The wife's "pin money" would be spent on, for example,
cosmetics and the beauty parlor, while her spouse allocated his "pocket money"
for, say, snacks and golf expenses. The agreement's final page contained a rare
paean to married love, remarking that "wise couples will not suffer their mutual
attachment to become casual and commonplace under the spell of monotony, or
to languish with neglect, or to degenerate into mere selfish passion.""1 ' On the
contrary, enlightened wives and husbands "will realize that in this life they
possess nature's most valued treasure-the loyal love of a human heart."2 3
Unlike the customary provisions for regulating contracts, the court's contempt
power directly enforced the terms of the reconciliation agreement. Indeed, the
wife and husband acknowledged that violation of the agreement's specifications
subjected the offender to the possibility of a fine, impnsonment or both.
Moreover, the agreement could not be rescinded by the parties. It remained in
force until further order of the court. Judge Burke claimed he used the contempt
powers "very carefully ,21 4 In the first biennial period, for example, twenty
contempt proceedings were instituted, resulting in jail terms for seven husbands
and three wives. 215 In addition to punishment for breach of the reconciliation
agreement, the court occasionally placed restraining orders on paramours or
relatives who interfered with the harmony of the family unit.21 6 In one instance,
Burke jailed a husband and his lover for five days after they had spent a night
together. 2 7 Since the husband's inamorata had endorsed the reconciliation
agreement, agreeing to stay away from the husband, the judge felt justified in
incarcerating both. "After that," remarked a divorce counselor in Judge Burke's
court, "people took these agreements seriously "2"9
The threat of coercion hung heavy over the proceedings. As a court counselor
elaborated to a wife unsure whether to believe her unfaithful husband's promises
to reform:
Your husband has agreed to promise in writing that he will never consort with the
lady again under penalty of going to jail. This is how sincere he feels about it. For

a man of his standing, the penalty ofjail assures you that his promise is not one that
has been lightly made." 9

212. Id.
213. Id.
VIRTUE, supra note 38, at 258.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217 Martin, supra note 198.
218. Id.
219. Burke, An Instrument of Peace, supra note 196, at 624. With a measure of
understatement, Judge Burke concluded that the "utilization of a reconciliation agreement, which
is readily compiled and signed at the very moment of reconciliation, lends dignity and weight to
the prormses made." Id. at 690.

214.
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Did the "gentle judicial coercion" work? The statistics are virtually
undecipherable and the methodological problems likely msurmountable."0 How
was reconciliation to be measured? Did failure to file a divorce suit for one year
signify that the parties had reconciled? The primary problem was that, even
dealing with a population in which one partner (at least) had expressed an interest
in staving off the break-up of the marriage, the therapeutic divorce advocates were
unable to show that their coercive gentleness succeeded. Robert J. Levy, serving
as the Reporter for the Special Committee on Divorce of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, went further, stating that the
"prevailing opinion seems to be that court-connected conciliation services are a
waste of time and money ,,21
XI. THE UNEASY UNION OF MARRIAGE COUNSELING AND THE LAW

The profession of marriage counseling emerged m the 1930s, but for years was
plagued by the paucity of mamage counselors as well as by the proliferation of
mountebanks. As late as 1949, an article in Women s Home Companion remarked
that marriage counseling was "a new idea for most of us" and proceeded to
outline its rudimentary principles, while advising its
female readership to beware
2
the "thousands of quacks" employed m the field.
That same issue of the Women's Home Companion earned an article conveying
the British viewpoint. The piece by David R. Mace, the General Secretary of the
National Marriage Council m England, reflected the striving for exclusivity
typical of budding professions in its complaint over the unauthorized practice of
mamage counseling: "The average woman would never think of doctoring her
neighbor's tooth or offering to represent her in a lawsuit. But she will cheerfully
and with great confidence embark upon the treatment of her neighbor's marital
problems. 223
The concern with fakery grew to enormous proportions during the 1950s. In
addition to the Women s Home Companion, Good Housekeeping and Cosmopol-

220.

The selectivity of the conciliation court rendered all reconciliation statistics virtually

meaningless. The claim that the court effected reconciliations m 43% of its cases takes on a
different coloration when weighed against the statistic that in 1957, for instance, the court only
handled 1380 of the 31,871 divorce, separate maintenance and annulment suits filed inLos Angeles.
See Martin, supra note 198. See also Louis H. Burke, The Role of Conciliationin Divorce Cases,
supra note 196 (confusingly presenting evidence of his success). For criticism of the Conciliation
Court's rosy statistics, see FOOTE ET AL., supra note 175, at 790-91.
221. ROBERT J. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 123 (1968) (monograph prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
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Evan Frances, How To Get Marriage Counseling, 76 WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION 36,

64 (Aug. 1949). On the orgins of the mamage counseling profession in America, see Robert G.
Foster, A Point of View on Marriage Counseling, 3 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGy 212 (1956),
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itan warned consumers about "flamboyant" advertising, impossible guarantees of
success, exorbitant fees and the tactic of insisting that the client sign up for a
specific number of sessions in advance.224 The American Psychologist estimated that 25,000 quack counselors earned more than $375 million in 1953, and
the report was still being trumpeted ten years later in the Saturday Evening Post
as "A Growing National Scandal."' 25
The demand for marriage counseling, from any source, appeared to be
expanding faster than the supply in the 1950s and 1960s. A national study
reported that while forty-two percent of all Americans who sought professional
mental health help m 1957 needed assistance with a marital problem, only four
percent went to a marriage counselor. Clergy, physicians, psychologists and
lawyers were contacted far more often, probably reflecting the paucity of
professional mantal counselors. 26 The rapid spread of an organization
modelled on the twelve-step program for recovenng alcoholics manifested the
surging need for marital help. Divorcees Anonymous was the creation of Samuel
Starr, a Chicago domestic relations lawyer who had found that "in practically
227
every case divorced persons "were sorry for the step they had taken. '
Chapters of Starr's organization sprung up in many localities throughout the
country, providing non-professional divorce counseling. The work of Divorcees
Anonymous consisted primarily of divorce survivors relating the horror stones of
their own experiences and proposing problem-solving alternatives to sinners on
the brink. The guilt of those who had sinned was the key weapon in converting
those about to fall into temptation.
These years also saw the spread of the notion that divorce lawyers were
pseudo-counselors, whose first goal should be the reconciliation of the troubled
couple. John Manano was the leading exponent of the view that attorneys should
overcome their "litigious predisposition" and practice "therapeutic listening" to
deal effectively with their divorce-seeking clients. Mariano advocated "juristic

224. See Where to Get a Mamage Counselor When You Need One, 149 GOOD HOUSEKEEPING
113 (July 1959); Morrs Fishbcm, Beware the Mind-Meddler 75 WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION 36
(Dec. 1948); Michael Drury, Are Marriage CounselorsAny Good? 134 COSMOPOLITAN 104 (Jan.
1953). The paucity of trained counselors was also bemoaned in the professional journals. See
William J. Goode, supra note 191; Kenneth R. Redden, Selected Bibliography, in DIVORCE AND
FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 74-77 128.
225. Bill Davidson, QuackMarriageCounselors: A Growing NationalScandal,236 SAT. EVE.
POST 17 (Jan. 5, 1963). See Peggy Strait, MarriageCounselors-Helpersand Hurters,N.Y. TIMES
MAO. 26 (Nov. 3, 1963) (expressing the same fear).
226. JOSEPH VEROFF ET AL., THE INNER AMEiuCAN: A SELF-PORTRAIT FROM 1957 TO 1976,
at 131-35 tbls. 5.11, 5.13, 5.15 (1981).
227. Samuel M. Starr, "Divorcees Anonymous" a Remarkable Success, in DIVORCE AND
FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 50-52. For a time in the 1950s, Divorcees Anonymous
garnered considerable media attention. See A. Prowitt, Divorcees Anonymous, 130 GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING 35 (Feb. 1950); Joseph Millard, Divorcees Anonymous, 56 READER'S DIG. 15 (May
1950); They Mend Broken Marriages, 149 AM. MAG. 107 (June 1950); Divorcees Anonymous, 66
TIME 64 (Sept. 26, 1955); Vance Packard, New Cure For Sick Marriages, 161 AM. MAG. 30 (May
1956).
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therapy," a listening technique for attorneys which served as "the infallible X-ray
needed to guide the analyst out' 2of the emotional neurosis into which the
psychoneurotic spouse had fallen. i 1
Manano s therapy was directive. In his view, the attorney's client was not the
individual but the marriage itself. Although Mariano subscribed to the broad goal
of maintaining the individual as a "wholly integrated personality," 9 he insisted
that a psychoanalytic lawyer should aim at developing a "juristic evaluation which
justifies maintaining the marriage.123 ' Although Manano maintained that
members of the bar should avoid practicing "psychiatry without a license," the
line between prescribed and proscribed therapeutic activity was difficult to
fathom. The matrimomal attorney overheard shouting at the couple in his office,
"Now, damn it, shut up. I'm telling you-you love each other," 23 1 undoubtedly
believed in his heart he was engaging in appropriate lawyerly therapy And
according to Mariano's directive guidelines, he was.uz
Edward Pokorny, Detroit's long-time statutory divorce proctor, once achieved
a reconciliation by ordering the couple to embrace and shoving them at each
other. On another occasion, the wife's mother interrupted a conference between
Pokomy and the couple by taking a toy baseball bat and beating her screaming
daughter on her rear end until Pokorny and the husband restrained her.
"Curiously enough," Pokorny related, "that reconciled them." These circus tales
do not a program make, although Pokomy's office claimed a turty-five percent
reconciliation rate.233
Disputes over the mission of therapy lay at the heart of the conflict over the
merger of counseling and the courts. In Utah, the state-sanctioned marriage counseling experiment came under fire from Judge Aldon J. Anderson, Chair of the
Judges' Advisory Committee on Mamage Counseling Services. Anderson
testified before the State Legislative Council that an unbridgeable gap had opened
between the courts and the marriage counselors. The Utah judges wanted the
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therapists to practice "directional counseling" in the belief that some couples
would benefit from explicit instructions. Since the marriage counselors had
rebelled at that oxymoronic construction of their role, Judge Anderson
recommended shutting down the whole project. He concluded that courts were
no place for mental health programs.234
New Jersey's experience reveals another facet of coercive conciliation. In
1956, the state supreme court's Committee on reconciliation proposed that
"Family Counseling Services" be established under the jurisdiction of the chief
probation officer. Aware of the unsavory implications of that juxtaposition for
couples under marital stress, the Committee at235the same time recommended that
the chief probation officer's title be changed.
That same iron-fist-m-velvet-glove approach characterized New Jersey's attitude
toward the voluntanness of conciliation. Initially, one of the parties should seek
help voluntarily, but if the efforts of the judge and the court staff to persuade the
couple to seek the assistance of the Family Counseling Services failed, that
"refusal should be met with an order requiring submission to the agency" No
concerns were voiced as to the consequences of expanding state power over
private lives. The end of reconciliation simply overwhelmed any queasiness as
to the coercive means. Paul Alexander's philosophy finds its justification in the
Committee's rationale:
may provoke resentment and tend to
Compulsion m so personal a matter
frustrate efforts to bring the parties together. But where neither spouse has sought
conciliation before seeking to dissolve the mamage by court action, should it be
assumed that the situation is hopeless and allow the litigation to proceed in ordinary
course? Or
should an attempt be made by mandate as a condition to institution of
36
the suit?
Following precedents in California and England, the New Jersey legislature
adopted the Committee's recommendation and established quasi-mandatory
marriage counseling as a concomitant of divorce actions in two districts for a
three-year period, commencing September, 1957 237 Within three years, the
experiment was abandoned as a massive failure. Of 2293 cases referred to the
divorce counselors, only fifty-seven had been reconciled, a failure rate of
97.3%."'
A few commentators believed that marriage counseling served a purpose in
demonstrating the futility of reconciliation in particular cases, and thus assisting
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the couple's adjustment to divorce. 3 9 This conversion of marriage counseling to divorce counseling was far from the unds of the family court advocates,
but it demonstrates the difficulty of limiting any profession to the preset rubric
of an interdisciplinary project. Mantal counseling's "unruliness" showed its
sensitivity to its internal principles and its clientele.
in

XII. CONCLUSION: THE SHERIFF AND THE SOCIAL WORKER
Do NOT MERGE
In the decade of the 1960s, therapeutic divorce reached a crossroad. Despite
the prodigious efforts of the therapeutic reformers, most family courts were still
hamstrung by what they perceived as antiquated laws which preserved the shell
of the adversary process and at the same time prevented the complete absorption
of divorce into the therapeutic project. Some commentators believed the movement had run its course without achieving any major breakthroughs. Others felt
that the critical mass would be reached in England or California, and reform on
therapeutic grounds would spark the long-awaited revolution in preserving
marriage.
Paul Alexander's leadership of the movement for therapeutic family courts
positioned the final drive for comprehensive divorce reform. Major proposals
embodying the Alexandrian ideal of merging the sheriff with the social worker
in the administrative echelon of the revamped family court were presented in both
England and California. But the drive for therapeutic divorce stalled. Concern
about the loss of individual autonomy found an ally in worry over the tremendous
cost of welfare-state family courts. Comprehensive restructuring along therapeutic
lines was defeated in both California and England.2' 4 The final shape of the
1969 divorce reforms finally conceded the overwhelming triumph of unrepentant
individualism. We now live with its consequence.
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